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Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and
Financial Re-Regulation
RAYMOND H. BRESCIAt
INTRODUCTION
In the deep throes of the Great Depression, in an effort
to restore faith in America's economy, the Roosevelt
Administration promoted, and Congress authorized, the
development of voluntary codes of conduct to govern
employment and manufacturing practices across hundreds
of industries. Compliance with these codes allowed
companies to display a "Blue Eagle" decal on the shop floor,
in their shop windows, and anywhere else their employees
might work or the general public might come across their
products. This symbol announced to the world that an
employer was "doing its part" for the national recovery
effort and was a business worthy of consumer trust. This
strategy was an effort by the Roosevelt Administration to
restore consumer trust in the recovery effort, to spur
consumption generally, and to promote the trustworthiness
of firms engaging in fair practices in particular.' In this
t Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School. The author would like to
thank Dan Ariely, Robert C. Ellickson, and Thomas Sander for their helpful
comments on previous drafts of this piece. I am grateful also for the assistance
of Mal L. Barasch in conceptualizing this work; for the research assistance of
Joseph Barlette, Meredith Perry, and Ashley Smith; and for the support of my
legal assistant, Fredd Brewer.
1. The so-called "voluntary codes" of conduct under the National Industrial
Recovery Act turned out to be not so voluntary; their violation could result in
criminal charges. See 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1934), invalidated by A.L.A. Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). As a result, the Supreme
Court struck down the law on which the system of conduct codes was based,
when it determined that Congress's delegation of legislative functions under the
Act was unconstitutional and the codes did not have a sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce. See Schecter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 499. Since the suggestion
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way, the Blue Eagle served as a heuristic-a cognitive
shortcut-that helped consumers show their support for the
recovery effort by patronizing companies complying with the
Blue Eagle program's codes.
Could this Depression-era technique-the use of the
Blue Eagle or some similar, useful symbol-serve important
ends today? Could it help restore consumer trust in the
institutions and actors in the financial system so that such
entities and individuals might earn consumer trust, and
prove trustworthy? This Article is an attempt to explore
these questions in the context of regulatory reform of the
financial system and determine if similar strategies could
be deployed to encourage both trust in, and more
importantly, trustworthy behavior among, actors within
that system.
At present, the United States faces a crisis of confidence
not unlike that which plagued recovery efforts during the
Great Depression.2 One aspect of this crisis is the relative
lack of trust in our financial institutions: the very
institutions that helped to inflate a speculative real estate
bubble, the collapse of which has brought about the greatest
economic crisis in eighty years. Efforts to restore trust to
the financial system are foremost on the agenda of the
Obama Administration and Congress.3 Without such trust,
credit markets will remain weak, consumer confidence and
spending will remain stagnant, and investors will seek the
safety of low-yield savings mechanisms while eschewing
here-that the Obama Administration should develop a truly voluntary code of
conduct for financial services institutions-would not suffer from the same
defects, it is unlikely that it would not withstand similar constitutional
challenges. For more information on the Blue Eagle program, see pp. 1439-40 &
n.266.
2. The literature comparing the Great Depression to the current financial
crisis is extensive. See, e.g., Christina D. Romer, Council of Econ. Advisors,
Presentation Before the Brookings Institution: Lessons from the Great
Depression for Economic Recovery in 2009 (Mar. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/events/2009/0309_lessons/0309_lessons
_romer.pdf.
3. The Obama Administration has laid out what it has called a "new
foundation" for regulatory reform of financial markets. See DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009),
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReportweb.pdf [hereinafter
Obama Plan].
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riskier investments that stand a better chance of promoting
job creation. The main vehicle for these trust-restoring
efforts is regulatory reform. And the primary focus of this
reform movement is an effort to rein in the shadow banking
system: a complex web of financial institutions and
transactions that developed and thrived in a deregulatory
atmosphere.4 Within this atmosphere, highly leveraged
borrowing fueled the build up and collapse of the subprime
mortgage market, which ultimately triggered the broader
financial crisis.5
Restoring trust in the financial system will be no small
feat. Philosophers and economists have long extolled the
virtues of trust in all human endeavors, particularly
economic ones.6 Trust acts as a lubricant and reduces the
transaction costs associated with economic conduct; its
presence makes economic activity more efficient and
permits actors to focus on wealth generation rather than
wealth preservation. Reconstructing a regulatory regime
that will foster the trust necessary to restart the economic
engine will require an understanding of what generates
trust. Yet the financial crisis was, in many respects, a
product of too much trust: trust in economists' forecasts, in
mortgage brokers and lenders, in assessments of the
4. Nouriel Roubini described the interplay between the shadow banking
system and the risks inherent to it as follows:
Last week saw the demise of the shadow banking system that has been
created over the past 20 years. Because of a greater regulation of
banks, most financial intermediation in the past two decades has grown
within this shadow system whose members are broker-dealers, hedge
funds, private equity groups, structured investment vehicles and
conduits, money market funds and non-bank mortgage lenders.
Like banks, most members of this system borrow very short-term and
in liquid ways, are more highly leveraged than banks (the exception
being money market funds) and lend and invest into more illiquid and
long-term instruments. Like banks, they carry the risk that an
otherwise solvent but liquid institution may be subject to a self-
fulfilling and destructive run on its liquid liabilities.
Nouriel Roubini, The Shadow Banking System is Unravelling, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2008, at 9.
5. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, Six Blunders En Route to a Crisiss, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2009, at BU7 (describing, inter alia, the role of leverage and subprime
lending in fueling the financial crisis).
6. See infra Part I.A.
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benefits of homeownership, in ever-rising home values, in
the Bernie Madoffs of the world, in the architects of complex
financial instruments, and in credit rating agencies.
Overarching these sentiments was a regulatory philosophy
that placed faith in the financial market itself: a belief that
the market, unchecked, would serve the ends of economic
growth and financial innovation. This web of trust fostered
predation, overconfidence and unregulated risk; it brought
about financial ruin for many and has caused incalculable
hardship across the globe. For all the talk of restoring trust
in the financial system, the proper focus of such efforts must
be the restoration not just of trust, but of trustworthiness.
To accomplish one without the other would simply invite
the same pathologies that helped bring about the current
crisis.
An approach directed at restoring trustworthiness to
the financial system will require an appreciation for what
makes such a system-and the actors within that system-
trustworthy. Such an effort is the modest goal of this
Article: to assess the manner in which formal and informal
institutions might promote greater trustworthiness,
particularly in economic endeavors. This requires an
assessment of how humans respond to internal and external
forces, as well as formal and informal rules. This
assessment borrows insights from a range of disciplines-
psychology, sociology, and economics-and several different
schools of thought, including Law and Economics,
Behavioral Economics, and New Institutional Economics. It
is an attempt to identify the role of law and legal
institutions in promoting trust and trustworthy behavior,
and suggest ways that such insights can inform any
approach to re-regulating the financial industry in the wake
of the financial crisis.
Insights from these disciplines and schools of thought
teach us several things. First, in situations where there are
only weak rules against cheating and little oversight to
monitor such cheating, it is more likely that people will
cheat. Second, when people are partnered with others in
long-term relationships in which cooperative behavior can
be developed, nurtured and rewarded, they are more likely
to cooperate in the pursuit of mutually beneficial ends.
Third, in situations with greater social distance between
people, individuals are more likely to engage in rent seeking
activity and act in a less trustworthy fashion towards each
other. Fourth, in environments where cooperation is
1364 [Vol. 57
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encouraged, either by actors communicating with each other
or when directed to cooperate by outside agents, people tend
to act in a more cooperative and trustworthy fashion.
What I hope to develop from these insights is a set of
principles that can help inform efforts to restore trust and
trustworthiness to the financial system. While I consciously
sidestep any granular prescriptions for re-regulating that
system, I hope these principles can help to inform that
effort. Because human beings are limited in their capacity
to process information, a major overhaul of the financial
regulations, on its own, is unlikely to restore trust in that
system on the ground, with the lay public. While I do not
dispute that there is an obvious need for such an overhaul, I
propose that regulatory agencies also develop a set of
voluntary codes of conduct for financial sector firms. To the
extent such firms follow these codes, they will be able to
market this information to consumers in an easily
communicated manner: in the same way the Roosevelt
Administration utilized the symbol of the Blue Eagle to
reflect compliance with codes of conduct across a range of
industries.
With these goals in mind, this Article proceeds as
follows. In Part I, I will provide an overview of the
importance of trust in economic life generally, which will
include a discussion of the interplay between trust and
economic growth. I will conclude this part with a discussion
of trustworthiness, including some thoughts on how to
measure the presence of trustworthiness in a given
community. In Part II, I will describe in detail the factors,
introduced above, that encourage people to be either
trustworthy or untrustworthy. In Part III, I discuss the
interplay between trust and law, describing the
complementary effect that legal institutions can have on
fostering and sustaining trust: an important inquiry
considering that present efforts to restore trust to financial
markets tend to focus on shoring up the financial regulatory
and legal infrastructure governing such markets. In Part
IV, I analyze the different ways the trust generating factors
outlined above tend to encourage cooperative behavior and
can be utilized in the different areas in which financial
regulation and re-regulation is needed. Finally, in Part V, I
propose a way in which regulatory reform can instill a sense
of trust in the financial sector that is founded on
trustworthiness. To this end, I propose that the financial
system adopt voluntary codes of conduct-and use a symbol
2009] 1365
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similar to the Blue Eagle to signify compliance therewith-
that can give assurances to regulators and, more
importantly, the general public, that financial institutions
are acting in ways that are trustworthy and deserving of
trust.
I. TRUST IN ECONOMIC LIFE
A. The Importance of Trust in Economic Exchange
For centuries, economic theorists have recognized the
importance of trust to economic exchange. In John Stuart
Mill's The Principles of Political Economy, the author
discusses the importance of trust and the "burthens" placed
on society from the lack of trustworthiness:
The advantage to mankind of being able to trust one another,
penetrates into every crevice and cranny of human life: the
economical is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet even this is
incalculable .... Conjoint action is possible just in proportion as
human beings can rely on each other.7
Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow has recognized that
trust is essential to nearly all economic activity: "Virtually
every commercial transaction has within itself an element
of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of
time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of
mutual confidence .... "8
In terms of the importance of trust in the financial
sector in general, and in bankers in particular, Adam Smith
famously pronounced:
When the people of any particular country have such confidence in
the fortune, probity, and prudence of a particular banker, as to
believe that he is always ready to pay upon demand such of his
promissory notes as are likely to be at any time presented to him;
those notes come to have the same currency as gold and silver
7. 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. VII, § 5, at
108-09 (Cosimo 2002) (1907).
8. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357
(1972).
1366 [Vol. 57
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money, from the confidence that such money can at any time be
had for them.
9
Similarly, and most recently, Niall Ferguson has argued
that money itself is a form of trust:
The intangible character of most money today is perhaps the best
evidence of its true nature. What the conquistadors failed to
understand is that money is a matter of belief, even faith: belief in
the person paying us; belief in the person issuing the money he
uses or the institution that honours his cheques or transfers.
Money is not metal. It is trust inscribed. 10
At present, there is no shortage of commentators
concerned with the current need to restore trust to the
financial system." Earlier this year, President Obama laid
out the issue succinctly:
9. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 292 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776).
10. NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
WORLD 29-30 (2008).
11. A wide range of actors, public and private, have stressed the importance
of restoring trust in the financial system. See, e.g., The Proposed Consumer
Financial Protection Agency: Implications for Consumers and the FTC Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Michael Barr,
Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Dep't of Treasury) ("We must
restore honesty and integrity to our financial system, in order to restore trust
and confidence.'); Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of
Securities Markets Before S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs -
Part II, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman &
Executive Officer, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) ("Creating a system
of consistent standards and vigorous oversight of financial professionals ...
which license they hold-would enhance investor protection and help restore
trust in our markets."); Bill Bradley, Op-Ed, Five Ways to Restore Financial
Trust, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A19 ("Restoring trust in the financial
system is the key to solving the current economic crisis.'); Timothy Geithner &
Lawrence Summers, Op-Ed., A New Financial Foundation, WASH. POST, June
15, 2009, at A15 ("By restoring the public's trust in our financial system, the
administration's reforms will allow the financial system to play its most
important function: transforming the earnings and savings of workers into the
loans that help families buy homes and cars, help parents send kids to college,
and help entrepreneurs build their businesses.'); Remarks by Assistant
Secretary Michael Barr on Regulatory Reform to the Exchequer Club (July 15,
2009) (as prepared for delivery), in Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg213.htm ("To rebuild trust in our
markets, we need strong and consistent regulation and supervision of consumer
1368 BUFFALO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 57
We also need a strong and viable financial system to keep credit
flowing to businesses and families alike. My administration will
do what it takes to restore our financial system; our recovery
depends upon it. And so next week, Secretary Geithner will
release a new strategy to get credit moving again - a strategy that
will reflect the lessons of past mistakes while laying a foundation
for the future. But in order to restore our financial system, we've
got to restore trust. 12
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has stressed the
connection between the need for reform of regulation of
financial markets and the restoration of trust to those
financial services and investment markets."); Citigroup Advertisement,
Confidence, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/advertising.htm (last visited
Sept. 22, 2009) (providing an advertisement explaining why people trust Citi
and Citi's commitment to its clients); Stephen Green, Group Chairman, HSBC
Holdings, Remarks Before the British Bankers' Association Annual
International Banking Conference: Restoring Governance and Trust (June 30,
2009), available at http://www.hsbc.com/l/PA_11S5/content/assets/newsroom
/090630_speech-bba.pdf ("[Riestoring trust means getting back to the raison
d'6tre of banking.'); Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), in Press Release, The White House
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/Remarks-of-the-President-on-
Regulatory-Reform/ ("That's our goal-to restore markets in which we reward
hard work and responsibility and innovation, not recklessness and greed; in
which honest, vigorous competition is the system-in the system is prized, and
those who game the system are thwarted.'); Remarks by the President After
Regulatory Reform Meeting (Feb. 25, 2009), in Press Release, The White House,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press office/Remarks-by-the-President-after-
Regulatory-Reform-Meetingt ("[T]o rebuild trust in our markets, we must
redouble our efforts to promote openness, transparency and plain language
throughout our financial system.'); Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Standard
& Poor's Commitment to Reform: Restoring Confidence in the Credit Markets
(July 16, 2009), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spd/pdf/fixedincome/SPW
SJ_OpEd_Ad.pdf (explaining the changes Standard & Poor's has implemented
in order to earn back the trust of their investors); Lawrence H. Summers, Dir.,
Nat'l Econ. Council, Remarks at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics: Rescuing and Rebuilding the U.S. Economy: A Progress Report (July
17, 2009) (as prepared for delivery), available at
http://piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchED=1264 ('The President
was clear from the beginning that these two tasks needed to be dovetailed-that
confidence in our ability to rescue the economy depended on a sense of our
commitment to reform and a vision for rebuilding.').
12. Remarks by President Barack Obama on Executive Compensation with
Secretary Geithner (Feb. 4, 2009), in Press Release, The White House,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressofficefRemarksbyPresidentBarackObama
OnExecutiveCompensationSecretaryGeithner/.
2009] TRUST IN THE SHADOWS 1369
markets. "3 There is broad agreement that this restoration of
trust is critical at this time of great distrust in our financial
institutions, where recent research indicates that only 22%
of Americans trust the financial system. 4
What, then, is trust: this essential-yet perhaps
intangible-feature of economic life, the restoration of
which seems essential to solving the present economic
crisis? What follows is a discussion of the meaning of trust:
how to define the term, how to measure it, and its
importance to economic activity.
B. Defining Trust
While there are many elements of the term "trust,"'5 I
adopt Frank Cross's "working definition" as my own: trust is
"the voluntary ceding of control over something valuable to
another person or entity, based upon one's faith in the
ability and willingness of that person or entity to care for
the valuable thing."'6 While there are many different forms
13. See Regulatory Perspectives on the Obama Administration's Financial
Regulatory Reform Proposals-Part Two Before the H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S.
Department of the Treasury) ("The reforms proposed in the Administration's
plan are designed to strengthen our markets by restoring confidence and
accountability, while preserving that tradition of innovation.').
14. PAOLA SAPIENZA & LUIGI ZINGALES, UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCHOOL OF Bus. &
THE KELLOGG SCH. OF MGMT., FINANCIAL TRUST INDEX (Oct. 19, 2009),
http://www.financialtrustindex.orglresultswave4.htm (showing 22% of
Americans surveyed trust the financial system).
15. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 591, 596 (2001) (reviewing literature on trust from various disciplines).
16. Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1461 (2005) (footnote
omitted); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness,
and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735,
1739-40 (2001) ("[Trust is] a willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another,
based on the belief that the trusted person will choose not to exploit one's
vulnerability (that is, will behave trustworthily).'); Angela L. Coletti et al., The
Effect of Control Systems on Trust and Cooperation in Collaborative
Environments, 80 ACCT. REV. 477, 481 (2005) ("[W]e consider trust to be one's
perception of another's trustworthiness."); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and
Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 474 (2002) (("[Trust is] the optimistic acceptance of
a vulnerable situation in which the trustor believes the trustee will care for the
trustor's interests."); Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited
Effectiveness of Legalistic "Remedies" for Trust/Distrust, 4 ORG. SCI. 367, 368
(1993) ("[N]early all research has at least implicitly accepted a definition of trust
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of trust, 17 it comes in two basic types: affective trust and
cognitive trust. "8 Affective trust is an emotional state and is
not based on the costs and/or benefits of such trust or on a
calculative assessment of the trustworthiness of another. 9
We can trust a spouse, a parent, or a good friend on an
emotional level: i.e., practically without thinking. Cognitive
trust, on the other hand, involves a conclusion based on a
cost-benefit analysis of the thing that is at stake for the
trusting, as well as an assessment of the likelihood that the
trusted will behave in a trustworthy fashion given a range
of factors, including: the trustee's history of
trustworthiness; and the severity, accessibility, and
effectiveness of the sanctions available to the trustor to rein
in the trustee's behavior.2 We run through a different set of
calculations when we place our child in the care of another,
our car keys in the hands of a valet, or valuable items in an
office cubicle. Some call this "calculative" trust.2 Some are
less sanguine about such trust; when one "trusts" in the
trustworthiness of another in such situations, one is merely
taking a "risk," and taking a risk is not the same as
trusting.22
Separating out each instance where one is applying
affective or cognitive trust can be difficult, however. I can
trust a neighbor on an emotional level to return a borrowed
tool because we are friends, have many things in common,
and generally share a world view. My decision to trust him
is also a reflection of the fact that I believe he would not
risk the loss of our friendship, the chance that he could
borrow a tool in the future, or his reputation in the
community as a trustworthy person if he were to take
as a belief, attitude, or expectation concerning the likelihood that the actions or
outcomes of another individual, group or organization will be acceptable or will
serve the actor's interests.") (citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Trust, Honesty and Corruption:
Reflection on the State-Building Process, 42 EUR. J. Soc. 526, 527-29 (2001)
(describing different dimensions of trust).
18. See Cross, supra note 16, at 1463.
19. See id. at 1464-65.
20. See id. at 1465-68.
21. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic
Organizations, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 485 (1993).
22. See id.
1370 [Vol. 57
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advantage of my trust in him. "Because trustworthy
behavior is very often a result of both internalized
noninstrumental values and instrumental motives, it
becomes in practice quite difficult to separate out
calculative from noncalculative trust-relevant behaviors."23
Just as trust has many different features, one's
willingness to trust in another is based on many different
factors in every situation in which trust may be sought or
called for. In this way, willingness to trust is contextual-
varying not just with each individual, his or her prior
experience with trusting generally, and in trusting in a
particular individual or entity-but also with a range of
instantiated elements present in each trust situation. As
Russell Hardin has argued, "[t]rust is a three-part relation:
A trusts B to do X. 24 Each of these parts is a variable in the
trust equation. A can be more or less trusting generally,
based on his or her experiences with trusting behavior in
the past, or can trust a particular individual while having
no faith in humanity in particular.25 An individual who
grows up in a bad part of town where predatory behavior is
the norm and who has little experience of the benefits of
trusting behavior may, nevertheless, trust a long-time
friend. Others are deserving of trust in certain
circumstances, and less so in others. A businessperson can
be a pillar of the community in affairs of money, with a
tendency to cheat on the golf course; a thief can be a loyal
friend and spouse.26
23. Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1717, 1727 (2006).
24. Russell Hardin, The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust, 21 POL. & Soc'Y
505, 506 (1993).
25. See, e.g., Thomas Gautschi, History Effects in Social Dilemma Situations,
12 RATIONALITY & Soc'y 131 (2000) (showing one's history with trusting and
untrustworthy behavior has an effect on that individual's willingness to trust in
the future); Roger C. Mayer et al., An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,
20 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 709, 728 (1995) (finding experiences with trust and
breaches of trust will inform perceptions of the trustworthiness of others).
26. In Steven Soderburgh's cinematic remake of Ocean's 11, George Clooney's
character, Danny Ocean, a high end grifter and con man, is accused by his wife,
played by Julia Roberts, of being "a thief and a liar." Danny professes that 'he
only lied about being a thief," defending his reputation for honesty to his spouse
regardless of his chosen profession. OCEAN'S 11 (Warner Bros. Pictures 2001),
available at http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/oceansl 1.pdf.
2009] 1371
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C. Trust, Social Capital, and Economic Growth
While the theorists cited above have promoted the
importance of trust to economic activity, how, on a practical
level, is trust important to such activity? Most essentially,
perhaps, trust reduces transaction costs because economic
actors have to spend less time and money searching for
legitimate economic partners and monitoring the behavior
of such partners. 7 Provided the partner is trustworthy and
upholds his or her part of the bargain, one spends less time
enforcing compliance with prior agreements. In this way,
actors can spend more time increasing wealth rather than
guarding it.
There is agreement that trust is important in a number of ways: it
enables cooperative behavior; promotes adaptive organizational
forms, such as network relations; reduces harmful conflict;
decreases transaction costs; facilitates rapid formulation of ad hoc
work groups; and promotes effective responses to crisis.
:2
We can see the harmful effects of too little trust in the
current economic climate. The financial crisis, moving
forward, has weakened trust generally in many economic
endeavors. Banks, not trusting consumers to be worthy
credit risks, have strengthened underwriting criteria and
27. ERIC M. USLANER, THE MoRAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST 17 (2002) ("Trust
helps us solve collective action problems by reducing transaction costs-the
price of gaining the requisite information that [two potential trade partners]
need to place confidence in each other. It is a recipe for telling us when we can
tell whether other people are trustworthy." (citations omitted)). Coase classified
transaction costs into four categories: search, information, negotiation, and
enforcement. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMIcA 386, 390-92
(1937).
28. Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline
View of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 393, 394 (1998) (citations omitted). Trust
also has broader, non-economic payoffs as well:
Trust promotes cooperation. It leads people to take active roles in their
community, to behave morally, and to compromise. People who trust
others aren't quite so ready to dismiss ideas they disagree with. When
they can't get what they want, they are willing to listen to the other
side. Communities with civic activism and moral behavior, where
people give others their due, are more prosperous.
Eric M. Uslaner, Democracy and Social Capital, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 121,
122 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999).
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restricted much commercial and consumer lending. 9 Those
same banks, particularly during the deepest days of the
crisis in the fall of 2008, did not trust the balance sheets of
potential lending partners and were reluctant to lend to one
another." Investors, lacking faith in the economy generally,
are fleeing to such safe opportunities as treasury bills and
federally insured savings accounts.3' Consumers, nervous
about the health of the economy and the safety of their own
positions, are starting to save rather than consume." This
may be a healthy approach for those consumers on a
microeconomic level, but with consumption down, the lack
of trust weakens the ability of the economy to expand on a
macroeconomic level, slowing attempts at recovery.
While recognizing the importance of trust to economic
activity, a critical question to ask when testing, empirically,
whether trust is essential to such activity, is how is the
relative level of trust in a society measured? If trust is
important to economic activity, one would expect to see
areas in which there are higher levels of trust faring better
economically than communities low in trust. In order to
address this issue, one has to be able to measure relative
levels of trust across communities.
One commonly accepted way to measure the presence of
trust in a community is to review responses to the World
Values Survey, a multi-nation study conducted every five
years that asks thousands of participants throughout the
world, among hundreds of other questions, the following:
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with
29. See Stephen Gandel, Lenders Look Beyond Credit Scores to Gauge Who's a
Risk, TIME, Jan. 9, 2009, http:lwww.time.com/timelbusinesslarticleO,8599,1870
450,00.html (explaining that lenders are going to less traditional methods of
determining creditworthiness of borrowers).
30. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lending Among Banks Freezes, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 16, 2008, at Al (explaining that despite efforts of central banks the
Libor index showed banks' reluctance to lend to each other).
31. See Jeff Sommer, Up 40%, but Still Feeling Down, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2009, at BU4 (explaining that investors are turning to safer investments as it
becomes more important to avoid big loses as opposed to making big gains).
32. See Jack Healy, As the Recession Worsens, Consumers Save More and
Spend Less, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at B3.
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people?"33 Participants are asked to decide whether "[m]ost
people can be trusted" or whether one "[n]eed[s] to be very
careful" in dealing with others.34
Another common way that social scientists and others
look at the level of trust within society and the extent to
which trust manifests itself in levels of civic cooperation
that both foster cooperation and increase trust, is to look at
the relative level of "social capital" within a given society or
community.35 Social capital is manifest in the "social
networks and the . . . norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness" associated with such networks.3 Such
networks and norms facilitate cooperation by generating
feelings of mutual obligation towards other members of a
network, encouraging information sharing, and conveying a
code of conduct that carries sanctions for a network
member's violation.37 Communities that have high levels of
social capital are better off economically and have lower
33. PIPPA NORRIS, DEMOCRATIC PHOENIX: REINVENTING POLITICAL ACTMSM
149 (2002) (citation omitted). Though not a perfect gauge of trust to any extent,
Norris believes "this item has become accepted as the standard indicator of
social or interpersonal trust." Id.
34. Id. For background information and to analyze the data results from the
2005 survey and prior surveys, see JAIME DIEZ MEDRANO, WORLD VALUES SURVEY
ASS'N, WORLD VALUES SURVEY V23 (2005),
http://www.jdsurvey.net/downloads/wvs2005a-v20090901_spss.zip; and World
Values Survey, www.worldvaluessurvey.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). A
sampling of the data from 2005 shows that some nations, like Finland and the
Netherlands, ranked very high in terms of individuals who felt that most people
could be trusted, with respondents in those countries agreeing with that
statement almost 60% of the time for Finland, and 45% of the time for the
Netherlands. In that year, Iraqis agreed with that statement over 40% of the
time, and respondents in the U.S., just under 40%. In countries like South
Africa and Colombia, the percentage of individuals agreeing with the statement
"most people can be trusted" was, not surprisingly, quite low: 19% and 15%,
respectively. MEDRANO, supra.
35. On measuring social capital and trust, see, for example, Christiaan
Grootaert et al., Measuring Social Capital: An Integrated Questionnaire 12
(World Bank, Working Paper No. 18, 2004).
36. Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum" Diversity and Community in the
Twenty-first Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 137 (2007).
37. For an overview of social capital theory, see, for example ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
(2000); and James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,
94 AM. J. SOC. S95 (Supp. 1988).
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crime rates, while the residents of those communities report
higher levels of life satisfaction.38
Unfortunately, there seems to be a great deal of
disagreement over how to measure social capital. Some
combine trust indicators, like the World Values Survey
described above, with gauges of levels of civic participation,
like the rates of involvement in civic groups such as bowling
leagues and religious congregations, among other factors,
claiming that such community involvement is both a proxy
for and result of social capital.39 Others argue that higher
levels of social capital in communities that function well are
a result of higher levels of trust in those communities
generally. To these theorists, what is valuable to a
community is not the extent to which its participants are
involved in community groups, but rather, the general level
of trust within that community.4 °  Certainly, civic
engagement can be both a product of trust-one that cares
for and trusts other community members will be more
willing to get involved in community activities-and can
also produce trust: when one is involved in community
activities, one gets to know one's neighbors or other group
members better, which lowers social distance and generates
higher levels of empathy and trust in others.4
38. See Michael Woolcock, The Place of Social Capitalism in Understanding
Social and Economic Outcomes, http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/5/13/1824913.pdf
(providing an overview of benefits of social capitalism).
39. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 37, at 415-26 (describing Putnam's
methodology for measuring social capital).
40. See, e.g., NORRIS, supra note 33, at 156.
41. The interplay between trust and social capital has been described by
Robert Putnam as follows:
In the first place, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of
generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust.
Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify
reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved.
When economic and political negotiation is embedded in dense
networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism are reduced.
At the same time, networks of civic engagement embody past success at
collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future
collaboration. Finally, dense networks of interaction probably broaden
the participants' sense of self, developing the "r' into the "we," or ...
enhancing the participants' "taste" for collective benefits.
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If there is some economic benefit from having higher
levels of trust and social capital in a community, as stated
earlier, one would expect to see greater economic activity
and growth in nations in which social capital and trust are
high. Many studies attempt to analyze this question and
most find a correlation between trust and growth. Indeed,
"[t]hose societies richest in social capital are all established
democracies with some of the most affluent postindustrial
economies in the world."42 A close analysis of the data
reveals that trust appears to be the central variable
generating growth, as opposed to simple levels of civic
engagement.
But the value of trust to growth cannot simply hinge on
whether people trust, as the economic crisis has shown. The
global economy did not want for trust. Rather, what we
experienced was too much trust: trust in mortgage brokers,
trust in investment banks, trust in credit rating agencies,
trust in asset values, trust in investment advisors, etc.
Tragically, such trust was too often met with a lack of
trustworthiness, and predation and irresponsible conduct
contributed greatly to the financial crisis. Therefore, a
deeper analysis of trust and trustworthiness is required
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital (1995),
reprinted in CULTURAL METEPHORS: READINGS, RESEARCH TRANSLATIONS, AND
COMMENTARY 109, 111 (Martin J. Gannon ed., 2001). But cf. USLANER, supra
note 27, at 128 (arguing civic engagement does not lead to greater trust);
Dietlind Stolle, Clubs and Congregations: The Benefits of Joining an
Association, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 202, 233 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2003) (finding
higher trust within groups a product of self-selection: higher trusting
individuals join groups rather than higher trust resulting from joining groups).
On the importance of trust to the functioning of democratic governance
generally, see Mark E. Warren, Democratic Theory and Trust, in DEMOCRACY &
TRUST, supra note 28, at 310-43.
42. NORRIS, supra note 33, at 153.
43. See, e.g., id. at 156 ("Social capital is associated with socioeconomic
development ... but this link appears to operate through social trust, not civil
society."); Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an
Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251, 1283-84
(1997) (finding a relationship between trust and economic growth, but finding
no evidence of relationship between social capital and such growth); Paul F.
Whiteley, Economic Growth and Social Capital, 48 POL. STUD. 443, 453, 460
(2000) (using response to questions related to trust of others on World Values
Survey from 34 countries from 1970 to 1992 and finding trust closely related to
economic growth and performance during that period).
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than one that equates trust, uncritically, to growth." What
the experience of the last decade appears to prove is not
whether trust is essential to economic activity, but rather
the extent to which trustworthiness is that essential
ingredient to make economies function well. If that is the
case, when asking whether we need to restore trust to the
financial system, what we must really mean is whether we
need to restore trustworthiness to that system. And if that is
the case, the correct questions to ask are: to what extent can
re-regulation restore such trustworthiness to the system; if
it can, what would be the optimal way to do so?
Again, as stated earlier, the conclusion typically
reached by these studies-that greater trust is equated with
greater economic growth and prosperity--cannot tell the
whole story. Indeed, as the economic crisis has shown, too
much trust can be toxic. The lead up to the financial crisis
was a failure of both too much trust and too much
untrustworthiness that preyed upon that trust. Since that is
the case, perhaps we have been looking at the wrong factor
in Hardin's trust equation. Perhaps what we need to look at
is not whether A trusts, but whether B is trustworthy: i.e.,
whether A's trust in B is misplaced, and what are the
consequences of that misplaced trust."
44. Of course, growth or income is not the only measurement of well-being in
a society, but I will use this as a gauge of economic activity generally because it
appears that at this critical economic juncture, restoration of trust and
trustworthiness is essential to stave off the worst impacts of the current
economic downturn, which have obvious broader social ramifications:
displacement and foreclosure, job loss, and hunger, to name just a few. For
alternative benchmarks for measuring development, see AMARTYA K. SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3-53 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1999).
45. As Hardin also points out:
Betrayal is, of course, not a failure of trust but a failure of
trustworthiness. It is odd therefore that academic writings-both
philosophical and social scientific-focus heavily on trust rather than
on trustworthiness. Indeed, most writings on trust tend to say things
that, as noted earlier, would make easy sense if applied to
trustworthiness but that make less sense when applied to trust. If such
statements make sense for trust at all, it is only indirectly through the
causal connection that trustworthiness begets trust.
Russell Hardin, Conceptions and Explanations of Trust, in TRUST IN SOCIETY,
supra note 41, at 32; see also Cross, supra note 16, at 1530. Cross, recognizing
the potential to abuse trust, notes that "more trust is not always preferable to
less trust. The key is distinguishing when trust is undesirable." Id.
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D. Trust and Trustworthiness
The first variable in the trust equation-whether A
trusts--cannot be the lynchpin between trust and economic
growth. It is apparent from the causes of the present
financial crisis that what matters more to economic growth
and sustainability is not whether A trusts, but rather
whether B is trustworthy in a particular context.
Trustworthiness then seems to be the essential element in
the economics of trust.' If that is the case, what are the
essential elements of trustworthiness, and if we are to bring
a more robust regulatory structure to the financial system,
can we tailor such a structure to enhance trustworthiness so
that trust in the financial context is sensible and does not
invite predatory conduct? " Before I turn to this issue, I will
address whether trustworthiness is itself a measurable
variable.
In one study, researchers working with a group of
undergraduates attempted to study the correlation between
responses to participants' survey questions regarding the
extent to which they might trust others, and their own level
of trustworthiness.48  Working from the participants'
responses to the National Opinion Research Center's
General Social Survey question, "Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be
too careful dealing with people?"49 , the researchers asked
the subjects to participate in a trust game involving the
46. It also seems to be the essential element in the morality of the trust-
trustworthy nexus. See Jane Mansbridge, Altruistic Trust, in DEMOCRACY AND
TRUST, supra note 28, at 290 ("Because trust is a probabilistic expectation, it is a
belief. We do not in general consider beliefs moral or immoral. Therefore trust is
neither moral nor immoral. In an interaction in which trust means only
prediction, the moral virtue is trustworthiness, not trust.').
47. Trustworthiness has been defined as "an innate personal characteristic
reflecting one's preference for upholding some social norm of behavior,
regardless of economic incentives. In contrast, we consider trust to be one's
perception of another's trustworthiness." Coletti et al., supra note 16, at 481
(footnote omitted).
48. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Measuring Trust, 115 Q.J. ECON. 811 (2000).
These researchers were replicating in some respects previous research that
sought to explore similar issues. See Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity, and
Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 122 (1995).
49. Glaeser, supra note 48, at 814.
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exchange of money." In this study, participants were
matched in pairs and one was given a sum of money that he
or she could keep or send to his or her partner in the
study. 1 Any sum sent to the partner was matched by the
researchers. 2 The recipient would then share what was sent
with the sender by returning a portion of what he or she
received.53 Because the researchers matched what was
ultimately sent to the recipient, the more money sent by the
sender meant that the recipient had more money to send
back to the sender. 4 At the end of the day, the sender could
send nothing, and get nothing in return, could send a
percentage of what was given him or her, or could send the
maximum amount initially received.5 Conceivably, provided
the recipient was not sent a very small sum, he or she would
send back half of what he or she received, which meant both
came out ahead, instead of having the sender simply keep
what was originally provided. Thus, through cooperation,
both participants could benefit to the maximum amount if
both parties cooperated and shared fully.
The results of the study revealed several findings which
were not groundbreaking. First, when the parties did not
know one another, it was less likely that they engaged in
conduct likely to optimize the outcome for both. When the
participants were not of the same race or ethnicity,
similarly, optimal outcomes were also less likely. These are
disheartening results, for sure. But what the researchers
also found, which might come as a surprise, was that the
participants' answers to the question regarding whether
people can be trusted said very little about the sender's
behavior in the experiment." That is, whether or not
someone was trusting generally bore little relation to how
much money the sender sent to the recipient. Rather, what
did tend to correspond positively to participants' attitudes
50. Id. at 819-23.
51. Id. at 820.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 820-21.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 821 (the participants were undergraduates at the same university
and some knew one another).
57. Id. at 822-27.
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towards the trustworthiness of others was how much money
the recipient sent back to the sender: returners sent back
more if they believed others trustworthy. 8 In other words,
what this study tended to show was that the extent to which
one says one trusts others may, in fact, be a reflection of
that person's trustworthiness. The more one says one trusts
others, the more likely it is he or she will, in turn, act in a
trustworthy fashion. According to the researchers, "[t]hese
findings suggest that the standard trust questions may be
picking up trustworthiness rather than trust."59 The results
"imply that the best way to determine whether or not a
person is trustworthy is to ask him whether or not he trusts
others."'
One example helps to prove the point that
measurements of trust are likely also measurements of
trustworthiness. Robert Putnam has drawn from data from
the Internal Revenue Service that analyzed differing levels
of tax compliance among the residents of different states in
the United States to compare such levels to the relative
levels of social capital within those states. 6 That research
reveals that states with low levels of social capital, as
measured by Putnam, who includes trust indicators within
his social capital index, also have low levels of tax
compliance. 62 The conclusions to be drawn from these
findings are not readily apparent and may raise more
questions than they answer.
Do such findings reveal the extent to which members of
a given community know whether their neighbors file their
taxes properly? Is this information neighbors tend to share
with one another? Does a low level of trust within a given
community signify that the residents of those communities
are keen-eyed evaluators of their neighbors'
trustworthiness? Does the extent to which they trust or do
not trust correlate significantly with whether their
neighbors comply with their obligations to pay taxes? Or is
another explanation for this correlation possible: i.e., that
58. See id.
59. Id. at 833.
60. Id.
61. PUTNAM, supra note 37, at 347-49 (tracking IRS data on state-by-state tax
compliance levels).
62. Id.
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individuals who trust less are likely to act in a less
trustworthy fashion by, for example, not paying their taxes?
Is this correlation a function of the fact that individuals who
do not trust their neighbors are less likely to behave in a
trustworthy fashion for fear of being the only suckers who
comply with a given norm or law?
The psychological and calculative forces at play in the
decision to pay or not pay taxes are likely complex, and are
probably at work in different ways for different people.63
Regardless of the particular reasons people do not pay
taxes, tax cheats are not trustworthy (at least in terms of
paying their taxes). And those who are not trustworthy are
probably less likely to trust others, either because they
would not trust themselves to behave in a trustworthy
fashion or they project this sentiment onto others. As a
result, communities with a low level of trust among their
members are also likely to include people who behave in a
less than trustworthy fashion. Groucho Marx famously
proclaimed that he would not join any club willing to have
him as a member,' and Jerome Blattner-who seems to be
famous simply for this quote-said that "a person who
trusts no one can't be trusted."65 Perhaps those who are
untrustworthy themselves are likely to think of others as
untrustworthy. What we may see at play here is the
psychological principle of projection, through which an
individual projects onto others the views he or she holds
63. See, e.g., Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A
Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972) (viewing tax compliance
patterns and applying a model similar to Becker's criminal compliance model to
explain tax evasion); Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to
Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 378-80 (2002)
(discussing reasons for noncompliance with duty to pay taxes); Chester N.
Mitchell, Willingness- To-Pay: Taxation and Tax Compliance, 15 MEMPHIS ST. U.
L. REV. 127 (1985) (discussing how undetected tax evasion encourages others to
not comply); Richard C. Stark, A Principled Approach To Collection and
Accuracy-Related Penalties, 91 TAx NOTES 115, 116 (2001) (discussing reasons
for noncompliance).
64. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 498 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006), available
at http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/qyd/ ("I do not care to belong to a club that
accepts people like me as members.").
65. WorldofQuotes.com, Jerome Blattner Quotations, http://www.worldof
quotes.comlauthor/Jerome-Blattner/l/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
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about him or herself.6 Thus, indicia of trust may also serve
as proxies for trustworthiness.
While I have discussed the importance of trust and
trustworthiness to economic life, the connection between
economic activity and lack of trust and trustworthiness is
also fairly obvious. Where there is less trust and
trustworthiness, there will be fewer economic transactions,
cooperation is likely to be costly and rare and there will be
less risk taking on the part of investors. This means firms
are less willing to engage in research and development, and
investors are less likely to invest in opportunities that
might create jobs. Where there is little faith in the legal
system to protect property rights or there are few investor
protections, people will not invest money to improve land
they might lose (instead, spending money defending their
land), and investors are less likely to trust the system to
police against fraud, insider trading, and other bad acts.
This makes investors more reluctant to take risks with their
capital; meaning it goes to less productive uses.
So what is it that makes people trusting or trustworthy?
The following part addresses this issue, and attempts to
develop a set of principles for fostering trust by asking what
forces might generate trustworthiness.
II. LAW AND ECONOMICS, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF BEING TRUSTWORTHY
A. Economic Behavior: An Open Debate
Before turning to the issue of what makes people
trustworthy, I will first discuss two schools of thought
regarding the behavior of economic actors-how they
respond to external, structural forces such as laws,
sanctions and oversight and such internal forces like bias,
honor, and reputation. Such a discussion can help inform
policy discussions concerning how to advance financial
regulation because these schools posit theories about the
66. On the psychological process of projection, see, for example, THE
DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 767 (Raymond J. Corsini ed., 2002), for the
definition of projection; and MARIE-LOUISE VON FRANZ, PROJECTION AND RE-
COLLECTION IN JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY: REFLECTIONS OF THE SOUL 1-25 (Open
Court Publ'g 1995) (1978), for a discussion of the concept of projection generally.
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manner in which human beings respond to such external
and internal forces.
The first school of thought, Law and Economics, which
is informed by neoclassical economic theory, posits that we
should craft policy decisions with the assumption that all
economic actors are rational in their decision making
processes, free of irrational influences, and take into
account a wide range of critical information before making
decisions that impact their economic well-being.67 The best
policies are those that take this perspective into account
and craft rules that help economic actors maximize their
wealth.68
In contrast, behavioral economists believe that human
beings are not always rational actors; instead, they make
decisions based on a range of irrational forces: emotion,
bias, imperfect information, overvaluation of their assets
and overconfidence in the correctness of their decisions.
66
Policies must take into account the potential pitfalls of
these irrational forces and create the best "choice
67. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer
Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 804 (2008) ("[The neoclassical conclusion [is]
that competitive markets-markets with multiple, self-interested players on
both sides, armed with relatively full information-will generate a mix of goods
and services that is superior to those that can be generated with various forms
of government regulation.") (footnote omitted).
68. The literature on Law and Economics is vast, to say the least. For some of
the early and seminal works, see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); RICHARD A- POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th
ed. 2007). A close cousin to Law and Economics, the New Institutional
Economics (NIE), takes into account the influence of institutions-which can be
formal, like laws and constitutions, and informal, like norms-on human
decision making. Many proponents of NIE would likely consider the sources of
some of the forces described below as institutions worthy of study. For an
overview of the NIE approach, see, for example, DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); and
Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 595 (2000). For a comparison of the NIE approach with
that of the Law and Economics movement, see RICHARD A POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAw 426-443 (1995).
69. For an overview of behavioral economics and its application in the legal
context, see generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000).
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architecture" for individuals to make enlightened, wealth-
maximizing decisions.7"
What do these different schools of thought say about the
causes of and cures for the financial crisis? Judge Richard
Posner, a leader in the Law and Economics movement,
argues that the behavior of both bankers and borrowers was
entirely rational; it just led to unchecked systemic risk that
now threatens the stability of the financial system.7'
Bankers looked at the short-term gains that could be gained
by investments in the U.S. housing market and other
sectors and pursued them aggressively. 72 According to
Posner, this may have been the most rational course of
conduct in the era of easy credit.73 Some borrowers, on the
other hand, were faced with the prospect of borrowing
money to purchase homes that, it was believed, would
continue to rise in value with little to no money down and
with little investigation conducted by lenders of those
borrowers' creditworthiness. Where a borrower would risk
nothing on an investment such that he or she had
everything to gain if the value of the asset increased, and
nothing to lose if it decreased in value, the rational course of
conduct in such a situation would be to jump at such an
opportunity. These rational choices-by bankers and
borrowers-ultimately led to the collapse of the system on a
macroeconomic level; what was rational for individual
actors tended to threaten the stability of the system as a
whole. Despite the admitted failure of the deregulatory
movement to rein in capitalism's worst excesses, or check
what is argued to be rational microeconomic conduct that
led to macroeconomic disaster, Law and Economics
proponents now bridle at the thought of aggressive re-
70. For an application of behavioral economics principles in a range of policy
areas, see generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
71. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 75-112 (2009) (assessing causes of the financial
crisis).
72. See id.
73. Id. at 83-85.
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regulation of financial markets, preferring a "wait-and-see"
approach.74
Behavioral economists look at the financial crisis as a
failure, primarily, of information asymmetries and
overconfidence.75 Borrowers were unable to make informed
decisions about the risky loan products to which they were
tethered. Brokers exploited this lack of information as well
as the overconfidence of such borrowers in the value of the
assets that secured the loans: i.e., the homes those
borrowers were purchasing with borrowed money. As a
prescription for these forces, solutions to the financial crisis
that are informed by behavioral economics focus on
improved consumer education76 and the promotion of a
standard mortgage as the norm in the mortgage market,
only to be departed from where borrowers have made
informed decisions to pursue more complex financial
instruments.77
Regardless of what vision of economic life holds true-
that humans are rational or irrational-what follows is a
description of research into what makes people trustworthy.
What this research reveals is that some conduct might be
entirely rational (for example, the decision to cheat where
74. See id. at 293, 296. Posner argues that it is "premature" to alter the
regulatory framework and that "[rieregulation, like reorganization, should
wait." Id.
75. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Poking Holes in a Theory on Markets, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2009, at B1 (interviewing and discussing beliefs of respected market
analyst Jeremy Grantham, who argues that the efficient market hypothesis led
to a feeling of overconfidence in the market and its ability to correct itself
leading to investors wrongly believing the crisis would solve itself; Mr.
Grantham believes that behavioral economic theory is more applicable to actual
markets); Robert J. Shiller, It Pays to Understand the Mind-Set, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2009, at BU5 (claiming that the mind-set of investors, essentially over
confidence, must be understood in order to fully understand the financial crisis);
Richard H. Thaler, Op-Ed., Mortgages Made Simpler, N.Y TIMES, July 5, 2009,
at BU4 (describing and concurring with current Treasury Department plans for
simplifying mortgage process and options in order to help consumers make
proper decisions and avoid disrupting economy in future).
76. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2008).
77. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 133-38; Michael S. Barr et
al., Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation, in BORROWING TO LIVE:
CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 170 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S.
Belsky eds., 2008).
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there is little chance one will be caught), and other behavior
entirely irrational (like believing that assets only ever
increase in value). As the following discussion shows, like
the different strands of trusting behavior, both emotional
and cognitive, there are instances where humans behave
both rationally and irrationally. We make decisions based
on sensible and sober assessments of the risks involved in
certain conduct, and, at times, we take plunges, act on
whims and rely on our gut instincts, regardless of the risks
associated with such decisions. We are impacted by the
formal laws that bind our conduct, as well as internal forces
like honor and external forces like gossip.
I turn now to a substantial body of research and
literature on decision making and cooperation, most notably
prisoner's dilemma games. I submit that this research
reveals that at times economic actors behave rationally, and
at times, irrationally: at times they react to external-both
formal and informal-forces, at times to internal forces.
That at times we cooperate when it is in our best interest to
cooperate and we compete when it is in our best interest to
compete, and vice versa. Perhaps economic conduct is, to
paraphrase Yogi Berra's wonderfully profound description
of baseball, ninety percent rational and the other half
irrational.78
In analyzing the results of this research, I will focus on
identifying the conditions that encourage people to act in a
trustworthy fashion, as well as those conditions that tend to
increase the likelihood that people will cheat, act in a non-
cooperative fashion and engage in rent seeking. It is not
necessary to align with a particular philosophical or
theoretical camp when doing this, because all seem to have
something important and relevant to say about human
behavior and the best ways to channel such behavior to
maximize utility, wealth and well-being.
Although there is no need to adopt any particular view
of human economic behavior for a further discussion of the
topic chosen, since this Article attempts to suggest the best
regulatory approach to restore trust to the financial system,
I will align myself with the emerging scholarship known as
78. See Joe LaPointe, Berra, at 83: A One-of-a-Kind Common Man, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at B13 (quoting Baseball Hall-of-Famer Yogi Berra,
famous for his gritty play on the field and colorful turns of phrases off of it, as
saying "Baseball is 90 percent mental and the other half is physical").
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the "New Governance."79 This scholarship attempts to
integrate and synthesize different approaches from
disparate theories in an effort to gain from the best insights
that can be culled from such theories. As Orly Lobel has
posited, such an approach, which she calls the "Renew
Deal," "represents a maturation of legal thought":"°
Rather than oppositional, the Renew Deal aims for an
appreciative positive stance, pulling together disparate
ingredients and synthesizing elements from opposing schools of
thought. Through new governance approaches, contemporary
thinkers can bring together in their research unlikely pairs, such
as privatization and democratic theory. The theory itself is thus
reflexive, in the sense that it calls for integration in legal practice
and correspondingly exemplifies hybridization in the academic
field. Indeed, the theoretical basis for the Renew Deal vision
mirrors its practical application in its inclusive spirit.81
With this spirit in mind, what follows is an attempt to
develop-through an effort informed by the disciplines of
psychology, sociology, and economics, together with game
theory-a set of principles that help promote trustworthy
behavior.
B. What Makes People Trustworthy
Research into human behavior in games and studies
involving cooperation tends to reveal that economic
79. Some representative scholarship in this emerging field includes, for
example, THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester
M. Salamon ed., 2002); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345-56 (1998); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004);
James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183 (2003); and Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought,
89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). In Part IV, I will also suggest a method for
approaching re-regulation of the financial system consistent with New
Governance approaches.
80. Lobel, supra note 79, at 449.
81. Id.
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behavior is in some ways predictable.82 Whether such
conduct is predictable rationally, as proponents of the Law
and Economics school of thought would argue, or
irrationally, like the behavioral economics posit, ' is
irrelevant for the sake of this discussion. Rather, we can
inform policy-making moving forward by gathering
information about how we respond to a range of forces:
external conditions, like laws, monitoring, and oversight;
promises to cooperate; and the features of our prospective
partners in economic endeavors. Given the critical role that
trustworthiness, as opposed to trust, must play in efforts to
re-regulate financial markets, what follows in this section is
a discussion of the results of a range of research into what
conditions appear to make people trustworthy or
untrustworthy. In sum, several critical themes arise from
this literature review: that a lack of oversight and an
absence of sanctions against cheating tend to increase the
likelihood that people will cheat; that the more individuals
participate in repeat cooperation games with the same
82. The most common of these games is the so-called prisoner's dilemma. The
traditional setup of the prisoner's dilemma game is to imagine that there are
two criminals who participated in the same crime and are being held by the
police in separate interrogation rooms. The criminals are faced with a choice:
each can choose to cooperate with the police, implicating his or her colleague
while securing a lighter punishment for him or herself; or each can refuse to
cooperate, leaving the police with little evidence with which to charge the
detainees. If one cooperates and one does not, the one who refuses to cooperate
will receive a stiff punishment. If both do not cooperate with the police, they will
both be set free because the police need the testimony of the criminals to make
their case. If both defect, and cooperate with the police, they will receive lighter
punishments than if either of them refuse to give information to the police while
the other sings like a canary. If the two criminals can coordinate their strategy,
and agree to refuse to give the police any information, they both benefit from
that strategy of cooperation (cooperation, that is, with each other, not the
police). In the face of mistrust of the other criminal (and they are criminals after
all), where there is a fear that the partner will defect and give the police the
information they want, the wise strategy is to cooperate with the police as
quickly as possible and rat out the other criminal in the hope of securing a
lighter punishment. However the game plays out, collectively, the two should
cooperate, while, individually, the wiser strategy is to defect, particularly if you
fear the partner is a defection risk. Many cooperation games utilize this basic
model, but with many different details and permutations. For a more in-depth
description of this classic model, see, for example, ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-10 (1984).
83. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008).
TRUST IN THE SHADOWS
partners, the more they are likely to engage in cooperative
behavior; that greater social distance between the trustee
and the trustor leads to greater rent seeking; and that
communication by and between participants about norms of
cooperation can increase the likelihood that individuals will
engage in trustworthy behavior.
1. Without Rules or Oversight, People Cheat. Robert
Ellickson has posited that there are three types of
constraints on self-interested behavior: first-, second-, and
third-party constraints.' First-party constraints are the
limits one puts on one's own behavior because of
motivations like a sense of personal honor.85 Second-party
constraints are the restraints on behavior imposed by others
with whom we are engaged in cooperative behavior; these
second parties can retaliate against us for our selfish
actions, which encourages us to behave.86 Third-party
constraints are the punishments that third parties can
exact on us for our disreputable conduct, like ostracism and
shaming.87 As Carol Rose points out, law, because of the
potential punishment that backs it up, is a form of "formal"
third party constraint.88 Ellickson and others posit that, in
many settings, informal, non-legal constraints are far more
effective in policing behavior than formal ones.89
The classic Law and Economics approach to explaining
law-breaking posits that individuals conduct rational, cost-
benefit calculations of these constraints when determining
whether to commit crimes or engage in anti-social behavior
and that such a calculation includes an assessment of the
84. Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of
Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STuD. 67, 71 (1987) (outlining typology of
constraints).
85. Id. at 71.
86. Id. at 71-72.
87. Id.
88. Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 536
(1994).
89. Ellickson, supra note 84, at 81-90 (rejecting what he calls the "legal
centralism" of modern law-and-economics scholars); see also Stewart Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV.
55, 60-67 (1963) (noting that business persons generally believe that formal
contracts can be unnecessary in certain business dealings).
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risk of being caught, the likely punishment for the act, and
the benefits to be gained by such conduct.9" To the extent
that internal forces are at work that might discourage one
from engaging in such behavior (e.g., one's concern with a
personal sense of honor or one's fear of guilt), this can serve
as a form of punishment in the cost-benefit analysis.9 ' While
unearthing the reasons people obey or do not obey the law is
beyond the scope of this review,92 an analysis of recent
research into the role of oversight in reining in cheating is
worthwhile. Such an analysis helps to inform the discussion
of the forces that might lead to trust and trustworthiness.
The results of this research show that without rules, people
cheat. And most people cheat in such situations, at least a
little bit.93
A collection of recent studies by behavioral economists
Nina Mazar, On Amir, and Dan Ariely is particularly
illuminating on this topic.' In those studies, conducted with
graduate students as participants, the researchers set out to
assess the conditions under which study participants might
cheat.95 In several different experiments, students were
asked to answer a series of questions on a range of
subjects.96 The students were to be paid for the number of
their correct answers on the tests,97 were given a work sheet
on which to submit their initial answers, as well as a final
90. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
91. For a discussion of the role of norms, see Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms:
Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAw & Soc'y REV. 157 (2000); and
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 661 (1998).
92. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (identifying
some of the external reasons people may obey the law, including the influence
that their interactions with the legal system have on their perceptions of
whether they consider it as fair).
93. See ARIELY, supra note 83, at 213.
94. See id.; see also Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Dishonesty in Everyday Life
and Its Policy Implications, J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING, Spring 2006, at 1, 6
(citation omitted) (discussing a 2005 survey conducted by Nina Mazar, On Amir,
and Dan Ariely).
95. ARIELY, supra note 83, at 198.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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answer sheet, which they were to submit to the monitor for
review.98 In control situations, where monitors could also
check the students' answers on their original work sheets
and final answer sheets against the right answers on the
quizzes, there was little opportunity for cheating.'
Several different scenarios were created where students
would have the opportunity to cheat. 10 Some were given the
right answers before they were to submit their final answer
sheets; others were given the answers and had the
opportunity to shred their initial answer sheets before they
submitted their final tally sheets; and still others were
given the answers, could shred their initial answers, and
were allowed to withdraw the money they were to receive
for the correct number of answers on their own. 1' In all
"cheating friendly" scenarios, the average test scores rose
when compared to the control group (although not by much
overall and in each cheating scenario the average test scores
were very similar). 2 Needless to say, the researchers did
not think that the participants in the cheating scenarios
were, on average, smarter than the control group.103 Rather,
they concluded that cheating explained the differences, and
cheating, not by a few rogues cheating a lot, but, rather, by
most participants cheating a little:
What did we learn from this experiment? The first conclusion, is
that when given the opportunity, many honest people will cheat.
In fact, rather than fmding that a few bad apples weighted the
averages, we discovered that the majority of people cheated, and
that they cheated just a little bit. 104
In a world with weak oversight (i.e., where the risk of
being caught is low) and few rules against cheating (as in
financial sectors where deregulation is the norm, like in
derivatives markets), the cost-benefit analysis would seem
to encourage cheating, predatory conduct, and rent seeking.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 198-99.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 200.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 201.
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Tragically, the subprime mortgage market, and the broader
financial system, seem to have been areas ripe for cheating
due to the general lack of oversight; an emphasis on
deregulation by regulators and legislators; and an
overheated mortgage market that encouraged
overconfidence, speculation and excessive risk-taking. This
dangerous mix brought about precisely what could have
been anticipated: rent seeking, predation, blinding avarice,
and unchecked greed. The guardians of the system have
admitted that their philosophies with respect to market
oversight were misguided and based on fundamental flaws.
In testimony before Congress, Alan Greenspan, in a now
infamous mea culpa, admitted the following: "I made a
mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations,
specifically banks and others, were [sic] such is [sic] that
they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders
and their equity in the firms."105 Christopher Cox, former
Chairman of the SEC, when ending the Consolidated
Supervised Entities program through which financial
institutions that lacked a clear regulator could voluntarily
submit to regulation, admitted that "voluntary regulation"
of such entities "does not work." 1
06
This discussion leads us to our first of the principles
that helps to induce trustworthiness: rules and oversight
matter. Without them, people are likely to behave in
untrustworthy ways and seek to exploit the situation for
personal gain.
2. The Greater the Opportunities for Future Dealings
with Partners in Repeat Play Games, the Greater the
Likelihood that Participants will Exhibit Cooperative
Behavior. One of the fundamental findings of research into
cooperative behavior is that participants are more likely to
exhibit cooperative behavior if they expect to deal with the
105. The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 33 (2008) (testimony
of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, U.S. Federal Reserve Board), available
at, http://oversight.house.gov/documents/200810241693819.pdf.
106. Press Release, Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Chairman Cox
Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm.
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same playing partners on multiple occasions in the future. 107
Robert Axelrod has pointed out that the optimal strategy in
repeat-play games is "tit-for-tat": where one participant
models the behavior of the other participant with which he
or she is partnered.' 8 In such settings, cooperation is
rewarded with cooperation and defection is punished with
defection.' °° This "logic of reciprocity," as Dan Kahan calls
it, reflects the fact that people will cooperate with others if
cooperation is exhibited; they will defect when others
defect." 0  The incentives in place-which encourage
cooperative behavior towards newcomers in the hope of
eliciting cooperative behavior, punishment for those who
defect, and forgiveness towards those who attempt to
restore cooperative behavior by exhibiting it themselves in
the hope of eliciting it from their partners-tend to foster
cooperative behavior among repeat players over the arc of
repeat games.1 1
Furthermore, research suggests that the cooperative
first move is likely to be the most beneficial move in repeat
games, even if one risks exploitation by the game partner on
107. See, e.g., Pedro Dal B6, Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future:
Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1591
(2005) (showing that cooperation increases as players interact repeatedly);
Robert Evans & Jonathan P. Thomas, Reputation and Experimentation in
Repeated Games with Two Long-Run Players, 65 ECONOMETRICA 1153-73 (1997)
(showing that reputation comes into play when a game is repeated over the
long-term leading to increased cooperation); Robert Gibbons, Trust in Social
Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games, in TRUST IN SOCIETY, supra
note 41, at 332-49 (showing participants more likely to cooperate in repeat
games because there is more likely a greater payoff from cooperation); see also,
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SocIALITY: ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC
EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES (Joseph Henrich et al. eds.
2004) (collecting results from cross-cultural studies of cooperative behavior).
108. AXELROD, supra note 82, at 13.
109. Id. at 11-19 (discussing the emergence of cooperation in repeat-play
prisoner's dilemma games); see also DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND
ECONOMIC MODELLING 65-89 (1990) (same).
110. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003).
111. See AXELROD, supra note 82, at 109. For a hypothesis of why norms of
cooperation develop in repeat play games, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167-83 (1991).
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his or her responsive move."2 Since the tit-for-tat strategy is
deployed most frequently, a cooperative first move is likely
to generate a cooperative second move in response,
generating the type of long-term benefits that can be
derived from the trust game.
As Robert Cooter points out, these repeat-play
phenomena present themselves in commercial and business
settings, encouraging cooperative behavior when repeat
interactions are expected between business associates.14
Repeat-play cooperation is also apparent in day-to-day
commercial transactions; when a retailer wants to
encourage future transactions with a potential customer,
his or her present conduct will include offering competitive
prices for the goods sold, better service, and reliable
products, even if this conduct means a greater outlay of
resources in the present to provide those services or lower
profit margins on the goods sold." 5 Similarly, firms with a
good reputation have a competitive advantage over firms
that do not where future opportunities are based on past
performance." 6 Research shows that even in a situation of
great conflict-in one example, litigation-agents for the
combatants, when those agents are themselves repeat
players and deal with each other constantly, are able to
foster cooperative behavior and bring their principals to
agreements resolving the conflicts between them more often
112. See AXELROD, supra note 82, at 113-17 (suggesting that one should never
be the first to defect); Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING
AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 227 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988)
(describing the benefits of a cooperative first move).
113. See AXELROD, supra note 82, at 31.
114. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1643, 1657-77 (1996).
115. For a description of how cooperative behavior in repeat play games occurs
in commercial settings, see, for example, Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The
Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, J. POL. ECON. 615
(1981); and Gilbert Roberts & James S. Renwick, The Development of
Cooperative Relationships: An Experiment, 270 PROCEEDINGS: BIOLOGICAL SCI.
2279 (2003).
116. See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in
PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A.
Shepsle eds., 1990).
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than agents who do not deal with each other with any
frequency. 117
3. Greater Social Distance Increases Untrustworthy
Behavior. Research shows consistently that where there is
greater social distance between individuals, they are both
less trusting, and each is more willing to take advantage of
the other person."' Like it or not, we trust those who are
like us, whom we perceive as being members of the same
group as ourselves."' We even tend to trust those who look
more like us than those who do not. 2 °
117. For research into the behavior of attorneys who frequently deal with each
other and who exhibit a greater propensity to settle their cases than attorneys
who do not, see Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit
Cooperation? Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 40-
41 (2002). Similarly, when cross-border commerce was first evolving in the
Middle Ages, merchants had to find ways to assess the trustworthiness of their
trading partners in the absence of an ability to monitor defection from great
distance or judge the quality of the goods traded. A class of intermediaries were
created-the law merchant-that helped to spread information about the
trustworthiness of trading partners. See Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges and the
Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 3 (1990).
118. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Other-Regarding
Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 653, 658 (1996) (finding non-
cooperative behavior increases with greater social distance). In Janet Landa's
famous study of rubber traders in Singapore and Malaysia in the 1960s, she
showed that a complex hierarchy of social relations determined the extent to
which a trader trusted another trader, with those closest in kinship to the
trader being trusted more, and with trust in the other trader decreasing as
social distance increased. Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically
Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981).
119. See Uslaner, Democracy and Social Capital, supra note 28, at 123-24
(noting tendencies to trust friends and other members of a particular group as
opposed to non-friends or non-members). This phenomenon reveals a paradox of
trust and the benefits that can derived from generalized and broad reaching
trust: "It might seem that we can only develop trust in people we know. Yet,
trust's benefits come when we put faith in strangers." USLANER, supra note 27,
at 1.
120. See Lisa M. DeBruine, Facial Resemblance Enhances Trust, 269
PROCEEDINGS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1307, 1311 (2002) (finding in the social dilemma
game that a participant's willingness to trust others improved when images of a
fictional partner in the game were manipulated to look more like the
participant).
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Social distance can be created by distinctions in race,
gender, nationality, and language, among other
differences.' 2 ' From cross-country and cross-community
analyses we learn that those nations and communities with
more heterogeneous populations have lower generalized
trust, and as that heterogeneity increases, trust
decreases.' Another measure of social distance is income
inequality, and societies with greater income inequality also
have lower trust.'23 Indeed, generalized trust in the United
States has declined in recent years as income inequality has
increased. 124
The effects of social distance can be found in
discriminatory lending practices and real estate
transactions. Lowered trust and heightened suspicion lead
to more predatory conduct and less cooperative behavior.
The fictional salesmen of John Steinbeck's The Grapes of
Wrath took advantage of the poor farmers looking to
purchase cars for the long journey to the West, treating
them as gullible, desperate, simple and uninformed: also, of
a lower class.'25 Mortgage brokers in the subprime mortgage
market exploited asymmetries of information to market and
sell mortgage products to prospective borrowers from
communities where credible lending options were scarce.
While at least some of these lenders allegedly exploited
borrowers' trust because they shared similar racial
121. For an overview of the concept of social distance, see Elizabeth Hoffman
et al., supra note 118.
122. See, e.g., Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey, The Sound of Silence in Prisoner's
Dilemma and Dictator Games, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 43, 46 (1999) (finding
greater likelihood of giving where there is greater closeness between
individuals); Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, The Determinants of Trust
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7621, 2000) (noting, inter
alia, that increases in heterogeneity within communities decreases levels of
trust within communities).
123. See Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 ECON. J. 295,
312-13 (analyzing various measures of income inequality within various
countries and finding that such inequality "is significantly related to" a decline
in trust in those countries).
124. USLANER, supra note 27, at 165-81.
125. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 61-66 (Penguin Books 2002)
(1939).
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characteristics, 126  the economic chasm between well-
compensated Wall Street executives and the working poor
borrowers who had subprime loans foisted on them was
wide and deep. It is likely, then, that the social distance
between creditor and debtor likely exacerbated the abusive
lending practices that were so rampant during the earlier
part of this decade.
4. Communication and Expressions Directed Towards
Encouraging Cooperative Behavior Lead to Greater
Trustworthiness. In one of the earliest prisoner's dilemma
experiments, subjects who were allowed to exchange notes
promising cooperation in advance of a trust exercise tended
to cooperate at a higher rate than those participants who
did not exchange similar promises.127 Furthermore, in a
range of prisoner's dilemma games, generally speaking,
when participants were directed by an outside agent in a
position of apparent authority (i.e., the monitor of the
experiment) to cooperate or compete, the participants
followed instructions at a greater rate than if no direction
was given either way.'28 In fact, the direction to cooperate
was followed with greater frequency than the direction to
compete. 129 Communication itself, even without an exchange
of promises to cooperate, can increase empathy between
parties and decrease social distance, leading to greater trust
regardless of such distance. 3 °
126. For example, in one case, Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co., No. 04-CV-
875, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61940, at *36-37 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007), plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants engaged in targeting of borrowers for unfair loan
terms along racial lines by, inter alia, advertising in newspapers patronized
primarily by the communities of color in Brooklyn, New York and matching
borrowers of color with salespeople of color.
127. See James L. Loomis, Communication, the Development of Trust, and
Cooperative Behavior, 12 HuM. REL. 305, 314-15 (1959).
128. See David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A
Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & Soc'y 58, 86-
87 (1995) (analyzing results of prisoner's dilemma games); see also, Elinor
Ostrom et al., Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is
Possible, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 404 (1992) (describing effects of communication
on cooperation in prisoner dilemma games).
129. Id.
130. Donna M. Desforges et al., Effects of Structured Cooperative Contact on
Changing Negative Attitudes Toward Stigmatized Social Groups, 60 J.
2009] 1397
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Another interesting study from Dan Ariely and his
colleagues reveals the impact of even unilateral
communications regarding trustworthiness.'31 In a series of
experiments, similar to the ones described above, students
were asked to solve a range of math equations.'32 A control
group was asked to solve the questions without any
assistance.'33  Another group was asked to solve the
problems, then write down on another sheet of paper the
number they solved correctly.'34 These participants were
then allowed to discard their work sheets so that the
monitor could not check whether the number of correct
answers they recorded was accurate. 3 ' As one can probably
guess by now, this group was the one more likely to cheat. 1'
The researchers added a twist, however; prior to taking the
test, the students in both groups were asked to engage in a
thought exercise."' A sub-group of each group was asked to
write down ten books they had read in high school while a
second sub-group was asked to write down as many of the
Ten Commandments as they could remember.'38 The results
of this study were striking. The students asked to list ten
books and who discarded their answer sheets reported to
have scored an average of thirty-three percent better than
those in the original control group."' Those students who
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 531 (1991); see also John M. Orbell et al.,
Explaining Discussion-Induced Cooperation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
811, 811 (1988) (finding communication "greatly increases the incidence of
cooperation" between group participants in cooperation games); Sally, supra
note 128, at 78 (analyzing results of prisoner's dilemma games and finding
cooperation increased by forty percent when participants engaged in
conversation before the experiment). On the importance of freedom of speech
protections to promote greater communication between citizens in a democracy,
see Jason Mazzone, Speech and Reciprocity: A Theory of the First Amendment,
34 CONN. L. REV. 405, 436-37 (2002).
131. Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of Honest People: A
Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008).
132. Id. at 635-37.
133. Id. at 635-36.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 636.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 635.
138. Id. at 635.
139. Id. at 636.
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were asked to recite the Ten Commandments and who
discarded their answer sheets scored the same as the
control group, and the number of the Commandments they
could recall bore no relation to their final score. 4 ' In a
similar study by Ariely and his colleagues, students were
given an additional opportunity to cheat when they were
asked to discard their answer cards. A sub-group of these
students was also asked to sign a pledge prior to submitting
their answers that they understood the test was being
administered under the school's honor code (even though
the school in question, M.I.T., had no honor code at the
time). 4 ' Those students who did not sign the honor pledge
claimed to have solved almost twice as many problems
correctly as the control group in that study; those who
signed the honor pledge scored the same as the control
group. 142
The results of these and the studies referenced above
lend support to the proposition that certain types of
communication can foster cooperative and pro-social
behavior: promises to cooperate between parties;
instructions to cooperate by monitors; and unilateral
communications regarding pro-social behavior. The
implications for the role that law can play in fostering
cooperative behavior are obvious: communications between
parties should be facilitated wherever possible, the role
monitors play in fostering cooperation should be clear and
should encourage cooperation, and parties should be asked
to make pledges that they will behave in pro-social ways.
In the financial services context, a series of steps could
incorporate the lessons from these findings: fostering
communications between actors within the system (by
enhancing face-to-face disclosure requirements), ensuring
financial firms understand the role regulators play in
overseeing the conduct of such firms, and expanding the
creation of fiduciary relationships (where agents would
profess their duties to their principals). I will return to
these and the other principles set forth above in subsequent
discussions. 143
140. Id.
141. Id. at 636-37.
142. Id. at 637.
143. See infra Part IV.
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III. LAW AND TRUST
Can efforts to bring new regulatory oversight to the
financial system generate the trust that everyone agrees is
necessary to rejuvenate the economy? Some argue that law
diminishes trust because it reduces the need for
interpersonal trust to mediate and promote human
cooperation.'" Others believe that informal norms and
social controls are more efficient and effective in ensuring
trustworthy behavior than regulatory regimes; indeed, such
norms can often operate effectively despite the existence of
an overarching regulatory regime. 1"' Such arguments might
hold true in tight-knit, homogenous communities, where a
range of sanctions-from informal shunning and
reputational harm to physical violence through self-help-
might prove effective in maintaining "order without law" as
Robert Ellickson suggests. " In the fictional Mayberry, a
small community where everyone knows everyone else's
business and commerce occurs on a regular basis within the
community, and where the fear that one might lose face, or
business partners, for disreputable conduct or unfair
dealings is real, such arguments are more likely to hold
true. "
144. Numerous critics have assailed efforts to substitute law for trust. See,
e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 27 (1995) (arguing that where law has become a substitute for trust,
it has brought about the breakdown of trusting relationships); id. at 309-11
(arguing that trust has been displaced by legalistic approaches to societal
disputes that are less effective and efficient); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (arguing that adherence to
the protection of individual rights through law undermines creation of a
community of shared interests); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV.
553, 580-84 (2001) (arguing that regulation promotes opportunistic behavior
that undermines trust).
145. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 111.
146. Id.
147. Even Ellickson remains "agnostic" about whether heterogeneous groups
can develop the types of informal controls that tight-knit groups might generally
develop:
The hypothesis predicts that welfare-maximizing norms emerge in
close-knit settings but is agnostic about whether such norms can
emerge in other social settings. This qualification is necessary because
an informal-control system may not be effective if the social conditions
within a group do not provide members with information about norms
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In a flat world, '48 where billions of dollars flow across
national borders at the stroke of a computer key, and
thousands of faceless transactions occur by the second
throughout the globe, it is difficult to imagine informal
norms and sanctions taking root and producing the types of
efficient outcomes that such norms may generate in other
settings. Indeed, the weak regulatory oversight of the
shadow banking system both fed and gorged on the
securitization of millions of mortgages without the bankers
that arranged those deals, or the investors who purchased
the fruit of those deals, ever meeting a single borrower.
Given what we know about cooperation, predation,
oversight, and social distance, it is hardly surprising that
the subprime mortgage frenzy, with its layers of complexity
constructed in an ever weakening regulatory environment,
triggered a broad and deep financial crisis, noteworthy in
many respects for a calamitous combination of blind faith
and bad acts.
Can an effort at re-regulation promote the type of
trustworthy behavior we need to foster trust in the financial
system? To paraphrase Edmund Burke: to make us trust in
the financial system, it must be trustworthy.'49 There is a
growing body of scholarship that shows that law can
promote trust, particularly in larger, heterogeneous
communities where trust alone may not operate effectively
to promote cooperation and curb predatory behavior. Since
law can promote trust, and since we have come to learn that
trust is both a reflection of our expectations that others will
act in a trustworthy fashion as well as our internal
assessment of the extent to which we, ourselves, are
trustworthy, there is an obvious symbiotic relationship
between trusting and trustworthiness. The discussion that
follows draws from the growing scholarship on the influence
and violations and also the power and enforcement opportunities
needed to establish norms.
Id. at 177 (footnote omitted).
148. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY
OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005).
149. When commenting on the revolution in France, Edmund Burke wrote: "To
make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely." EDMUND BURKE,
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, AND ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN
CERTAIN SOCIETIES IN LONDON RELATIVE TO THAT EVENT IN A LETTER INTENDED TO
HAVE BEEN SENT TO A GENTLEMAN IN PARIS 116 (1790).
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of law and trust, and generates some potential conclusions
about the role of law in promoting trustworthiness.
Law can promote trust in several ways. The presence of
laws to enforce contracts and protect property rights
expands the metaphorical "circle of trust" and allows
economic ventures to occur between actors and firms that do
not have close, personal relationships founded strictly on
affective trust. ' Similarly, the presence of laws and an
oversight regime can reduce the need for information about
the reliability of those in whom one places trust. In such
situations, one can rest instead on the confidence in the
system's laws and oversight mechanisms to reduce the
likelihood of rent seeking, or improve the likelihood that
such rent seeking will be punished. The presence of such a
legal regime thus encourages others to engage in
cooperative behavior."'
When people are confident in the legal regime to punish
cheating, people are more trusting. '52  Similarly, the
availability of contract remedies-those sanctions
associated with enforcement of contract obligations against
contract breakers-encourages parties to contract in the
first place and strengthens trust by increasing the belief in
the trustworthiness of others (due to knowledge that others
are unlikely to break their contracts if sanctions are
available).' 5  Confidence in those sanctions to foster
150. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 16, at 1499 ("While law may reduce the need to
rely on trust, this effect may end up extending the range of possible transactions
rather than undermining those that can rest entirely on trust."); Simon Deakin
et al., Contract Law, Trust Relations, and Incentives for Co-operation: A
Comparative Study, in CONTRACTS, CO-OPERATION, AND COMPETITION: STUDIES IN
ECONOMICS, MANAGEMENT, AND LAW 105, 133 (Simon Deakin & Jonathan Michie
eds., 1998) ("Institutional forces [like contract law] do not simply constrain
individual agency, but channel contractual behavior which would not otherwise
be feasible.").
151. See, e.g., NIEIAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 50-51 (1979). Whether this
type of calculative decisionmaking-that I will have confidence in the law to
serve as a hedge against untrustworthy behavior, and so I "trust" another
enough to engage in business relations with him or her--can be considered
"trust" is irrelevant. What matters is the cooperative conduct that is a product
of that confidence.
152. Alesina & La Ferrara, supra note 122, at 3 (discussing how effective
criminal prosecution leads to more trusting behavior).
153. See Simon Deakin et al., supra note 150, at 105-43 (discussing how
contracts have a significant and positive effect on trust); Mark Granovetter,
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trustworthy behavior minimizes the need to monitor the
conduct of the trusted, particularly where such monitoring,
itself, can reduce feelings of trust'54 (although this is not
always the case-the presence of monitoring can also
generate feelings of trustworthiness, as the discussion of the
study by Coletti and others, discussed below, shows).
Contract law and its remedies can encourage both trusting
and trustworthy conduct: "By giving legal assurances of
remedies for breaches of trust, the law makes parties more
likely to be both trusting (thanks to the hedging effect of the
legal remedy) and trustworthy (to avoid sanctions)."'55
While common wisdom might suggest that controls on
behavior can be costly and can lead to reduced trust because
the subjects of that control fear other participants are less
trustworthy (hence the need for controls),15 at least one
series of studies has shown that controls on behavior can
actually lead to greater perceptions of the trustworthiness
of the subjects of those controls, as well as more cooperative
behavior."' Participants in this study of cooperative
behavior were asked to assess the trustworthiness of other
participants in an experiment where participants played the
role of managers of companies and given control over
research budgets.'58 They were then asked to commit
Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J.
Soc. 481, 491 (1985) (describing how institutional arrangements like contracts
generate trust).
154. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 16, at 1501 (arguing that when monitoring is
necessary in the absence of contract remedies, such monitoring can cause
distrust).
155. Cross, supra note 16, at 1483. Law can also have an "expressive function"
such that laws that promote cooperation and encourage trustworthy behavior
can, themselves, generate trust. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak:
Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039, 1041
(1999) (discussing the expressive function of law, and its impact on norms);
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). Law can also "frame" a norm of cooperation by
creating a cooperative social context in which trusting and trustworthy behavior
are encouraged. See Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 1796.
156. See, e.g., Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems,
Decision Frames, and Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684 (1999).
157. Coletti et al., supra note 16, at 477.
158. Id. at 486-87.
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resources to cooperative ventures with managers from other
fictional companies.'59 There were benefits to cooperating
with the other companies/participants but also rewards for
non-cooperative behavior.1" Some of the participants were
monitored to determine if they engaged in cooperative
behavior and some were not and all were told whether they
were monitored or not.'6' A third observer/participant was
then asked to assess the trustworthiness of the participants
in charge of the research budgets to determine whether
their actions were cooperative or not.'62 Regardless of the
actual conduct of those observed participants, the observers
regularly perceived the participants under the monitoring
and control system as more trustworthy than the
participants under no controls or monitoring, merely
because of their faith in the monitoring system to encourage
trustworthy behavior.63
A second experiment then also tested the lasting effect
of cooperative conduct on repeat players, even after the
monitoring controls were removed.' The results of the
second test showed cooperative behavior continued even
after participants that were the subject of controls were
informed that the controls had been lifted.'65  Those
participants cooperated more frequently in subsequent
trials than those who had never been subject to monitoring,
even after the parties learned the monitoring had ended.'66
The authors of this study conclude as follows:
This study suggests that one approach to increasing trust is to
strengthen the control systems used to govern collaborative
agreements, both in terms of their incentives and their feedback.
That is, through increased monitoring, sanctioning, and
rewarding, firms can induce higher levels of cooperation. The
control-induced cooperation, when observed by collaborators via
feedback mechanisms such as performance reports, will engender
159. Id. at 486.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 489.
164. Id. at 490-93.
165. Id. at 493-96.
166. Id. at 495.
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trust, thereby reinforcing the positive effects of the control
mechanisms. 1 7
The feedback effect that occurred as a result of the
monitoring and oversight reveals another impact that law
can have on trust: law can promote trusting and
trustworthy behavior, which, in turn, increases trust and
encourages more cooperation in the future. In other words,
law can help encourage the initial cooperative move that is
so important for encouraging trusting and cooperative
behavior. Once parties begin to engage in cooperative
behavior, and such behavior is productive and beneficial,
this conduct can serve to establish a base of trust from
which more cooperative behavior can be launched. Thus, the
legal infrastructure can encourage both trusting and
trustworthy behavior, and lead to more of both in the
future. "Because legal structures penalize those who would
breach trust, they encourage and reward trustworthy
behavior. Hence, as the amount of trustworthy behavior in
society consequently increases, a raising of the affective
trust baseline should generally follow.""16 In this way,
instead of crowding out trust, trust and a legal regime can
be complementary."'
Just as the level of trust present in a society generally
has a positive impact on growth, nations that have strong
investor protections, and which honor the rule of law and
contract and property rights, tend to have higher rates of
economic growth than low trust/weak rule of law nations. 170
167. Id. at 478-79.
168. Cross, supra note 16, at 1509.
169. ROSALINDE KLEIN WOOLTHUIS ET AL., ERASMUS RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF
MANAGEMENT, TRUST AND FORMAL CONTROL IN INTERORGANIZATIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS 12 (2002).
170. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 834-37 (2001) (finding that
stronger investor protections promoted higher levels of investment); Cross,
supra note 16, at 1516-17 (discussing the value of strong investor protections in
investing); see also Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions,
113 J. POL. ECON. 949, 988 (2005) (finding robust evidence that property rights
institutions "have a major influence on long-run economic growth"); Cross, supra
note 16, at 1525-27 (analyzing several measures of the rule of law within
nations and finding strong correlation between the rule of law and economic
growth); Martin Leschke, Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor
Analysis, 11 CONST. POL. ECON. 265 (2000) (analyzing cross-country data and
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This makes intuitive sense. Investors are more willing to
invest in stock markets or to place funds on deposit with
banks, if they feel that there are strong investor protections
within those markets and healthy regulatory oversight of
those financial institutions. And more risk-taking and
investment leads to greater economic activity. Potential
economic partners are more willing to cooperate and enter
into mutually beneficial partnerships when they feel they
can pursue contract remedies if the obligations imposed by
their agreements are violated. Potential property owners
are more likely to purchase property if they are confident
that their interests will be protected by the property rights
regime and their property will not be expropriated by the
state arbitrarily.
This last point seems to lead to yet another fairly
obvious conclusion about trust, law, and trustworthiness:
rule of law, investor protections, property rights, and
contract laws not only foster trust, but they lead to
trustworthiness. These protections signal to potential
cheaters that violations of trust will be prosecuted and
abuses of trust punished. Whether such behavior is a
product of benevolence or calculated concern about
sanctions is irrelevant. Furthermore, the connection
between rule of law and economic activity is not
coincidental: less rent seeking and predatory conduct will
lead to more consistent economic growth, greater
cooperation in the future and better, more sustainable
showing rule of law promoted economic growth); Ismail Serageldin & Christiaan
Grootaert, Defining Social Capital: An Integrating View, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A
MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 40, 50 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds.,
1999) (comparing effectiveness of informal norms in Brazilian garment industry
and formal mechanisms in Chilean garment industry and showing higher
economic activity in Chile). Proponents of New Institutional Economics promote
the effectiveness of formal laws and informal norms in fostering economic
growth, particularly in the developing world. See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE
LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 16-17
(2006) (arguing that the existence of formal laws, promotion of the rule of law,
and informal norms are critical to economic growth in the developing world);
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD
WORLD (1989). For a critique of the effectiveness of transporting rule of law
concepts into developing economies, see for example, Katharina Pistor, The
Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COviP.
L. 97, 124-29 (2002); and David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies
in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062, 1089-93.
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economic activity moving forward. The interplay between
norms of trust, institutional protections against
untrustworthy behavior and long-term economic activity
has been described as follows:
Interpersonal trust and cultural norms are essential elements in
long-term trading relationships, but whether either of these can
flourish for long in the absence of support from more permanent
institutional forms may be doubted. Systems built up around rigid
forms of normative regulation may seem to carry a short-term cost
in terms of their inflexibility and lack of responsiveness to
external change by comparison to systems which are more open to
entry and where the impact of competitive forces is more
immediate. But equally, this very rigidity and permanence of
institutions may be a source of competitive advantage: in the
longer run it may be that strong and stable institutional
mechanisms are needed to promote dynamic efficiency, in terms of
the capacity7of a productive system to promote innovation and
adaptation.
While this is an observation about trust in general, if
trustworthiness can be complemented by the legal
infrastructure, it will produce trust moving forward:
"[71 rustworthiness commonly begets trust. My
trustworthiness potentially rewards your trusting me (if you
act on your trust). Hence, if something conceptually entails
or causes trustworthiness, then indirectly it tends to cause
trust." 
72
Perhaps close-knit communities that are high in social
capital operate efficiently and effectively, where sanctions
for anti-social behavior are powerful, although informal.
The global financial infrastructure is well beyond the reach
of such informal sanctions, and legal institutions are
necessary to rein in predatory conduct.
[A]s the modern capitalist State matures, representative forms of
governance with a clear hierarchical structure and a system of
laws, rules, and regulations enforced by traditions replace the
"community" as the guardian of social, business and personal
contracts-and as the sole agent with a preemptory right to use
force. The point is simple: one form of "social capital" is partly
replaced by what might be thought of as another, an effective
171. Simon Deakin et al., supra note 150, at 134.
172. Russell Hardin, Conceptions and Explanations of Trust, in TRUST IN
SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 17.
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Webbehan bureaucracy that either substitutes or complements it
in accomplishing the same sort of things-nonmarket allocation
and distribution. 1
73
Law thus plays a complementary role in fostering,
extending, and rewarding trust. It broadens one's range of
potential trading partners. It serves to both identify and
communicate the range of acceptable conduct, and punish
what is beyond that range. It protects property interests
and contract rights, which facilitates trust, economic
activity and productive uses of property. Because of the
beneficial effect of law on trust, attempts to foster trust and
trustworthiness in the economy, through re-regulation of
the financial system, are worthy of our attention and effort.
What follows is an application of some of the principles set
forth above in the context of the need for re-regulation of
the financial system, including an analysis of how trust and
law broke down in the lead up to the financial crisis, and
where they seem to have served to prevent predatory and
reckless conduct effectively.
IV. RESTORING TRUST TO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: PRINCIPLES
TO INFORM RE-REGULATION THAT WILL HELP RESTORE TRUST
In this part, I will review the application of the four
principles set forth above-oversight, repeat play, social
distance and communication-and assess the ways in which
they might have been present or absent in the events that
led to the financial crisis. I will make some modest and
general proposals for how these principles might be invoked
in the process of re-regulation: to match the ends of re-
regulation with effective means.
A. Oversight and Enforcement
First and foremost, to restore an ethic of
trustworthiness in the financial system, there are a number
of legal black holes that must be eliminated, where either a
lack of regulation or positive legal exemptions exist that
shield certain actions or products from serious legal or
regulatory oversight. In these sections, I will address just
three: credit rating agency practices that are purportedly
173. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Formal and Informal Institutions, in SocIAL CAPITAL:
A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE, supra note 170, at 65.
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shielded by free speech protections; assignees of securitized
loans that are shielded by the holder in due course doctrine
from liability for illegality in the consummation of the loans
in their portfolios; and the exemption of such products as
credit default swaps from regulation.
1. Credit Rating Agency Protections. Credit Rating
Agencies are private entities that assess the
creditworthiness of financial products. While there are
certain instances where their role in assessing the
creditworthiness of a particular financial product is
mandated by federal statute, they are often recruited by the
issuers of a financial product in the hope that the agency's
assessment of that product will give confidence to potential
investors in the value of and risk associated with it. Such
investors will, in effect, delegate the role of investigating
the product to the agency, often leaving the due diligence in
assessing the risk associated with investing in that product
to those agencies. The credit rating agencies have a
preeminent importance in the financial system,'74 mostly as
generators of investor trust, which, in turn, greases the
wheels of investment by giving investors confidence as they
make decisions about investing.175 Another striking reality
about the credit rating agencies is that they are largely
immune from both regulation and private legal liability.
Credit rating agencies are licensed by the SEC,"' but there
is little oversight of these entities once they receive SEC
approval to operate. Indeed, in a legislative sleight of hand
that accomplished deregulatory ends through the guise of
affirmative legislation, while Congress authorized the SEC
to license the rating agencies, it also prohibited that body
174. In 1996, Thomas Friedman of the New York Times famously said: "There
are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There's the United
States and there's Moody's Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy
you by dropping bombs, and Moody's can destroy you by downgrading your
bonds. And believe me, it's not clear sometimes who's more powerful." Public
Broadcasting System, Newshour (PBS radio broadcast Feb. 13, 1996), available
at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/gergen/friedman.html.
175. Such ratings became a "heuristic," a shorthand or proxy for the relative
quality of the assets backing certain securities that assisted potential investors
in making investment decisions with respect to those securities. On the
functioning of heuristics, see infra Part IV.
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 780-7 (2006).
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from regulating "the substance of credit ratings or the
procedures and methodologies" employed by the rating
agencies.'77 Apart from this regulatory vacuum, in most
instances, the ratings agencies are immune from private
liability for the forecasts they issue; their ratings are
treated as commercial speech, protected by the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and thus insulated
from most legal challenges from investors arguing that they
relied on rating agency statements about a particular
investment. '78
In addition to the lack of oversight over credit rating
agencies in the buildup to the subprime mortgage crisis,
these agencies faced a clear conflict of interest; they were
paid by the issuers of subprime securities to assess the
creditworthiness of the borrowers whose mortgages backed
those securities. 79 If an issuer did not like the credit rating
it received from a credit rating agency for a particular round
of securities it was issuing, not only could that issuer shop
around for other rating agencies to review those securities,
it could take future ratings business elsewhere.' 0 As a
177. § 78o-7(c)(2).
178. See, e.g., Deryn Darcy, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How
the "Issuer Pays" Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It,
2009 CoLuM. Bus. L. REV. 605, 632-33 ("[C]ourts have proven somewhat
receptive to the agencies' arguments that their ratings are opinions protected
under the First Amendment.") (footnote omitted); Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk
After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for Rating Agency
Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1055 (2009) ('This First Amendment
hurdle has made it extraordinarily difficult to establish that rating agencies
engaged in libel and has left issuers without legal recourse except in outlier
cases.').
179. See Darcy, supra note 178, at 622-27 (describing the "issuer pays" conflict
of interest).
180. See, e.g., Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit
Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 227, 246-48 (2009) (describing the conflict of interest in the "issuer pays"
business model); Manns, supra note 178, at 1052-53 (describing the inherent
conflict of interest in relationships between rating agencies and issuers); Roy C.
Smith & Ingo Walter, Rating Agencies: Is There an Agency Issue?, in RATINGS,
RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 289, 302-04 (Richard M.
Levich ed., 2002) (describing competition among ratings agencies that can lead
to the issuance of more favorable ratings to attract and maintain issuer-
customers). For an argument for creating a user-pays compensation system), see
Manns, supra note 178, at 1059-69. For an argument that the prospective
reputational harm to rating agencies that results from poor performance is
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result, there were clear economic incentives that drove
rating agencies to issue ratings that met with the approval
of the issuers: they feared the present and future loss of
business if they did not.
When mixed with the lack of regulatory oversight and
the "virtual immunity" from liability from private parties, 181
such incentives were ultimately disastrous and led to poorly
supervised ratings practices that failed to take into account
adequately the risk associated with mortgage-backed
securities and their core and systemic vulnerability to a
broad downturn in the housing market. Of course, it was
this historic downturn in the market that precipitated the
present financial crisis. And the credit rating agencies
either failed to take the possibility of such a downturn into
account when issuing their ratings, or because of the
incentive structure, neglected to warn the issuers of
mortgage-backed securities that such a downturn could
threaten the viability of those securities. In either scenario,
they failed to provide the type of sober forecasts and
assessments of the securities they were rating, which gave
investors a false sense of confidence when purchasing
securities blessed by those agencies.
The Obama Administration's regulatory plan suggests a
list of principles to inform the imposition of more stringent
regulation on ratings agencies. 182 Greater regulatory
oversight is obviously necessary, and private liability must
be imposed, particularly in situations where conflicts of
interest might cloud the judgment of the ratings agencies. A
proposal that would restore trust in the credit ratings
agencies would encourage them to assume, on a voluntary
basis, a fiduciary relationship with the investors that rely
on their ratings. Through the assumption of such a
sufficient to rein in rating agency conduct see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
181. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 302 (2006) (noting credit rating agencies' "virtual immunity" from
liability in private litigation).
182. The Obama Plan stresses the need for greater transparency through the
disclosure of the ratings agencies' methodologies, the potential conflicts of
interest under which the agencies operate and the risks associated with the
products the agencies assess. Obama Plan, supra note 3, at 46-47. It also calls
for the reduction of the use by regulators of credit ratings agencies "in
regulations and supervisory practices, wherever possible." Id. at 46.
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relationship, they would have to proceed in a manner that
was free of conflicts of interests, could not engage in self-
dealing, and would be compelled to put the interests of the
client-investor ahead of their own.'83 Adopting such a
relationship voluntarily would send a clear signal to
potential investors that the rating agencies agreed, at a
minimum, to be conflict-free in their assessments of the
investments they rate."s It would thus "frame" the
relationship as one bounded by trust, where the rating
agency agreed to be held accountable for breaches of that
trust. Indeed, the failure to honor such fiduciary
obligations would subject the agencies to legal liability to
their clients-who would be, again, the potential investors,
not the issuers.
Rating agencies could choose to assume this duty and
would be required to disclose whether they were willing to
assume a fiduciary relationship or not, preferably in a large-
type disclosure that could be transmitted with any rating
the agency generated. In order to promote the most
confidence in rating agencies that assumed the duty, and to
discourage rating agencies from choosing not to assume the
duty, any disclosure would have to be particularly explicit.
For example, the rating agency that chooses not to adopt
the fiduciary relationship should have to reproduce a
disclosure like the following, in large type:
The credit rating agency issuing the rating of this security has not
agreed to enter into a fiduciary relationship with the investor who
may or may not rely on this rating. This means that this rating
may be influenced by a conflict of interest, and the agency has not
agreed to be liable to the investor in the event there are errors in
183. For an overview of fiduciary obligations, see generally Arthur B. Laby,
The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99 (2008);
Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 71-79 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985); and Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795
(1983).
184. I have proposed this same sort of voluntary assumption of fiduciary
duties in the context of the borrower-mortgage broker relationship. See
Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the
Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 304-05 (2008).
185. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 1796 (arguing fiduciary law
"frames" relationships to encourage trustworthy behavior).
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this rating and may put the interests of the rating agency or the
issuer of the security ahead of the interests of the investor.
Hopefully, investors reading such a disclosure would be
discouraged from relying on the report of the rating agency.
It is likely that rating agencies will be forced to adopt such
duties or risk being driven out of the market by those
agencies willing to do so.
2. Assignee Protections. Another mechanism that
reduces accountability in the financial industry, particularly
in the operation of the mortgage securitization process, is
the so-called "holder in due course doctrine."' 6 This doctrine
was adopted to shield innocent purchasers of interests from
any alleged fraud or other illegality in the initial creation of
that interest and works to ensure that such purchasers can
have faith in their purchases (another instance of an aspect
of the legal architecture that builds trust and leads to
greater economic activity). 17 This doctrine can, in effect,
"scrub" otherwise defective instruments of the tarnish of
illegality that may have been present in the creation of the
interest, including fraud and unconscionability ' The
doctrine is particularly relevant in the subprime mortgage
market because of the common practice of bundling
186. See, e.g., Vern Countryman, The Holder in Due Course and Other
Anachronisms in Consumer Credit, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1974) (describing the
holder in due course doctrine).
187. Engel and McCoy have described the doctrine as follows:
To satisfy the requirements of a holder in due course, the purchaser
must be the holder of a negotiable note, who took the note for value, in
good faith, and without notice that the note contains certain defects. To
meet the definition of a "holder," the assignee must possess the note
and the note must be "issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to
bearer or in blank." If a note is payable to an identified person or entity,
the note must bear an endorsement or be among a group of loans to
which an allonge was attached. When assignees qualify as holders in
due course, they take the notes free of most defenses to nonpayment
and affirmative claims that borrowers could have pursued against the
originators.
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2053 (2007); see also
Countryman, supra note 186, at 2 (describing the holder in due course doctrine).
188. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 14-
1, 14-2 (5th ed. 2000).
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subprime mortgages into pools of loans and issuing
securities backed by those loans. The holders of the
securities are likely to invoke the protection of the holder in
due course defense to shield them from liability in the
consummation of the loans that serve as the collateral for
and income streams of the mortgage-backed securities.'89
The invocation of such a defense, if successful, would shield
the purchasers of subprime securities from claims of
borrowers that the underlying mortgages were the products
of discriminatory or other illegal acts. Yet there are many
exceptions to this defense,'9 ° including that the assignee
knew or had reason to know that there was some
irregularity in the mortgage or other interest he or she
purchased."' Moreover, several statutes such as the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA)'92 and Home Ownership Equity
Protection Act (HOEPA)'93 have exemptions from the
doctrine; 94 the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) extend liability for
discrimination in certain circumstances,'95 and many have
argued that this doctrine should be inapplicable in the
context of subprime lending.'96 A bill currently pending
189. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What
Does Wall Street Have to Do With It?, 15 HOUSING POLY DEBATE 715, 715-16
(2004), available at http://www.mi.vt.edu/data/files/hpd%2015(3)/hpd%2015(3)
_articleengel.pdf (describing relevance of holder in due course doctrine to
subprime mortgage securitization); Cassandra Jones Havard, To Lend or Not to
Lend: What the CRA Ought to Say About Sub-Prime and Predatory Lending, 7
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 16-18 (2005).
190. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2235-38 (2007) (describing exceptions to holder in due
course doctrine).
191. Id. at 2236.
192. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1615 (2006).
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1648.
194. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 187, at 2052-54 (describing, inter alia,
TILA and HOEPA exemptions).
195. See Peterson, supra note 190, at 2239-40.
196. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending,
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV.
503, 640 (2002) (arguing that the holder in due course is not necessary in
residential mortgage loans); Siddhartha Venkatesan, Note, Abrogating the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More
Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 177
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before Congress, which has passed the House of
Representatives, would expand the TILA exceptions to the
doctrine by authorizing rescission of a loan if it met the
requirements for TILA rescission, even if the loan had been
passed on to an assignee.197
I could not possibly add to the substantial body of
scholarship that has attacked the holder in due course
defense on historical, moral, practical, and/or doctrinal
grounds.9 ' Instead, when analyzing the incentives in place
in the mortgage market that contributed to the present
financial crisis, one must admit that the presence of the
holder in due course doctrine, with its ability to shield
investors from potential liability for the bad acts of the
creators of the interests in which they invest, when coupled
with the confidence in the interests the credit rating
agencies generated, likely contributed to the ease with
which capital flowed into subprime securities.
The holder in due course doctrine obviously creates
incentives that facilitate the flow of capital to the
instruments the doctrine covers. This flow can have positive
and negative ramifications. Securitization of mortgages
frees up mortgage capital to generate more mortgages,
which, under normal conditions, would generally produce
positive externalities. To the extent that the doctrine
distorted the incentives and encouraged some lenders to
promote mortgages they would normally not extend if they
(2003) (advocating an affirmative cause of action against predatory loan
assignees).
197. See H.R. 1728, 1lith Cong. § 204 (2009) (extending "limited" TILA
liability to assignees and securitizers of loans under certain conditions).
198. The literature critiquing the holder in due course doctrine is extensive.
See Countryman, supra note 186, at 10; Eggert, supra note 196, at 636; Engel &
McCoy, supra note 187, at 730-31; Julia Patterson Forrester, Constructing a
New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing, 75 OR. L. REV.
1095, 1138 (1996); Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable
Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 461 (1979); Ronald J. Mann, Searching
for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951, 1007
(1997); Walter D. Navin, Jr., Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Contracts,
48 N.C. L. REV. 505, 550 (1970); Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs
It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 375-76 (1971); Edward L. Rubin, Learning from Lord
Mansfield: Toward a Transferability Law for Modern Commercial Practice, 31
IDAHO L. REV. 775, 776 (1995); M.B.W. Sinclair, Codification of Negotiable
Instruments Law: A Tale of Reiterated Anachronism, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 625, 625
(1990).
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feared that they would face claims of fraud or
discrimination, the doctrine should be discarded.
One approach to accomplish this end would require that
all mortgage loans contain language similar to the language
required by the Federal Trade Commission in contracts
involving consumer goods and services. Such language
makes such contracts "non-negotiable" for the purposes of
the holder in due course doctrine, rendering them outside
the doctrine's protections. '99 Another technique would
include using limits on the doctrine to reduce the potential
effects of social distance by exempting all claims against
any financial instrument under the FHA and the ECOA,
laws designed to proscribe discrimination in mortgage
lending and other practices. Creating full exemption" of
such provisions from the application of the doctrine would
likely force the potential purchasers of instruments to police
the underlying transactions better to ensure that they were
not consummated in a discriminatory fashion, rather than
simply turning a blind eye to the types of practices that
were rampant during the height of the subprime mortgage
market."20
3. Credit Default Swaps. Another area that is ripe for
regulatory overhaul is the market in credit default swaps:
essentially insurance policies that banks and investors
purchased as a hedge against a downturn in the mortgage
market and a reduction in the value of mortgage-backed
securities. During the height of the subprime mortgage
market, these instruments gave investors a false sense of
security; not only did investors believe their investments
were secured by assets, they also purchased insurance
against the (perceived) unlikely event that the market
experienced a downturn. Companies offering these
199. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Final Regulations,
Proposed Amendment and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506,
53,512 (Nov. 18, 1975). For an analysis of this FTC Rule, see Peterson, supra
note 190, at 2237-38.
200. Presently, the FHA and ECOA apply to assignees if they engaged in some
form of discriminatory conduct with respect to the underlying loan, or knew or
should have known of discriminatory conduct on the part of the seller of the
instrument. See Peterson, supra note 190, at 2239-40.
201. For a discussion of the role of racial discrimination in subprime lending,
see infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
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instruments were more than willing to guarantee the health
of housing market assets: insuring those assets, to some,
must have seemed like insuring that the sun would rise in
the morning. And perhaps the fact that investors and
investment banks were relying on credit default swaps as a
way to reduce the risk of their investments was a sign that
they were acting irresponsibly and taking into account any
doubts they had about the strength of the U.S. housing
market. 202
The problem with credit default swaps was that they
turned out to be ephemeral, not worth the paper they were
written on (unless, of course, the U.S. government decided
to back them). It is hard to think of a financial instrument
that is more a product of the deregulatory philosophy than
credit default swaps. In essence, these were treated as
derivatives when Congress chose to impose a regulatory
regime on credit default swaps in particular and derivatives
in general. Tragically, the regulatory regime Congress
imposed was one of no regulation at all. In fact, with
passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, in
the twilight of the Clinton Administration, and with bi-
partisan support, Congress not only said that regulators
could not regulate these instruments as insurance or as
financial products °3 but also directed that such instruments
could not even be regulated as gaming." As a result,
investors put their faith in credit default swaps even though
any oversight of those instruments was expressly
prohibited. The fallout from this misplaced trust, trust that
had no recourse to the law when it turned out it was
misplaced, has been severe, with its greatest impact falling
on U.S. taxpayers, who ended up footing the bill for nearly
$160 billion to back up AIG's CDS promises."5 A
philosophical bent towards deregulation thus generated a
legal vacuum, one that was exploited when times were good,
but ended up leading to financial ruin once the good times
passed.
202. For an overview of the role of credit default swaps in increasing and
encouraging risky investment practices, see POSNER, supra note 71, at 56-60.
203. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f (2006).
204. See 7 U.S.C. 16(e)(2) (2006).
205. See Gretchen Morgenson, AI.G., Where Taxpayers'Dollars Go to Die, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at BUi.
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The Obama Administration has set forth a series of
principles that should reform the regulation of credit
default swaps and other derivatives, these include the
following: the development of standardized and regulated
trading platforms; the imposition of capital requirements
for issuers of derivatives; the introduction of mechanisms to
improve transparency of derivatives; and the identification
of clear regulatory authority over the derivatives market."2
The need for rules and oversight in the derivatives market
cannot be overstated."7 The absence of such rules had tragic
consequences for the financial system, creating the sense of
deep uncertainty and crisis in the late summer/early fall of
2008. It is obvious that regulation of this sector of the
financial system is desperately needed. The types of reforms
proposed by the Obama Administration seem to reflect the
types of conditions that are likely to generate trustworthy
behavior, and are thus worthy of serious consideration: the
imposition of oversight, regulation and capital requirements
would all seem to have the effect of reining in the riskiest
behavior within this market, fostering trust and
encouraging trustworthiness.
B. Reputation and Repeat Play
As stated earlier, one of the forces that can encourage
greater cooperation is the extent to which parties are
engaged in a series of transactions, and rely on each other's
willingness to cooperate to encourage greater cooperative
behavior in the aggregate. This can include both two-party
games, where parties generate trust among each other to
increase cooperative behavior between them, and situations
involving many participants, where individuals are
members of groups and wish to develop reputations as
cooperative members within such groups. If one cheats
another member of that individual's group, there is the fear
that information shared within the network of members will
discourage others from trading with the cheater, limiting
206. See Joint Hearing on Regulation of Over the Counter Derivatives Before
the H. Comm. on Financial Services and the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th
Cong. (2009) (testimony of Timothy Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Treasury)
[hereinafter Geithner Testimony]; see also Obama Plan, supra note 3, at 46-51.
207. According to Secretary Geithner, the value of the derivatives market in
2008 was nearly three-quarters of a quadrillion dollars. See Geithner
Testimony, supra note 206.
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his or her trade opportunities. Thus, individuals engaged in
activity with others that is more likely to be repeated,
where knowledge networks will spread information about
the trustworthiness of those individuals, are more likely to
behave in a trustworthy fashion.
Financial institutions, as organizations, engaged in a
wide range of risky-and to a great extent, untrustworthy-
behavior during the height of the era of easy credit. But not
all financial institutions are worthy of blame, and even
some of the most untrustworthy, it turns out, engaged in
sensible behavior in certain areas. Indeed, two examples
from the lead up to the financial crisis reveal these
phenomena, and make the case that informal norms and
reputational effects likely served as robust checks on
predatory conduct, even in a time of loosening standards
and weak controls on such conduct.
The first example is the functioning of small and
community banks during the height of the subprime
frenzy.2"8 While some local banks became conduits for the
208. See generally The Effects of the Economic Crisis on Community Banks and
Credit Unions in Rural Communities: Hearing Before the Financial Institutions
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong.
(2009) [hereinafter The Effects of the Economic Crisis on Community Banks and
Credit Unions in Rural Communities] (statement of Peter Skillern, Executive
Director of the Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina)
(testifying to the "stability small banks have provided" in rural areas during the
financial crisis as they largely steered clear of subprime lending); id. (statement
of Ed Templeton, President/CEO of SRP Federal Credit Union on behalf of The
National Association of Federal Credit Unions) (asserting that credit unions,
unlike large financial institutions, remained free from entanglement in the
subprime lending crisis); Phillip Longman & T. A. Frank, Too Small to Fail,
WASH. MONTHLY, Nov./Dec. 2008, at 14, 14-15 [hereinafter Longman & Frank,
Too Small] (citing specific examples of community banks that stayed away from
subprime lending and are doing well as a result); see also Greg Bordonaro, Local
Banks See Uptick in Activity, HARTFORD Bus. J., Oct. 20, 2008,
http://hartfordbusiness.com/news6900.html (explaining that small, local banks
are assuring customers they are separate from the turmoil in financial markets
and your money is safe); Katie Zezima, Vermont Bank Thrives While Others Cut
Back, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at B4 ("While many of the nation's large and
midsize banks are staggering under the weight of bad mortgages piled up
during the housing boom, the First National Bank of Orwell, Vermont's smallest
bank ... is having its best year in recent memory."); Press Release, Indep.
Cmty. Bankers of Am., ICBA statement on FDIC Quarterly Bank Report (Aug.
22, 2007), http://www.icba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=37054
&sn.ItemNumber=1733&tn.ItemNumber=1915 ("[C]ommunity banks have
strong deposit growth, have maintained solid underwriting standards, have
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securitization process, offering up their residential loans to
the larger investment banks in an effort to access the
securitization cash machine, many small financial
institutions, rooted in their communities, did not engage in
risky lending behavior, did not lower their underwriting
standards, and were motivated by concerns for their
reputations within the communities they served. Many were
motivated to maintain and preserve long-term customer
relations with their clients and attract more prospective
clients that would, in turn, become long-term customers as
well.2" Many small banks practiced the boring art of taking
healthy collateral, and have had little or no exposure to subprime lending. They
are among the most highly regulated financial institutions in the nation.");
Video: Phillip Longman & T. A- Frank, Community Banks to the Financial
Rescue, (New Am. Found. Op-Ed Video Nov. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/specialsave-americas_finances bring-
backcommunitybanking_8399 [hereinafter Longman & Frank Video Op-Ed]
(describing the positive practices and effects of community banking).
209. See The Effects of the Economic Crisis on Community Banks and Credit
Unions in Rural Communities, supra note 208 (statement of Frank Michael,
President and CEO, Allied Credit Union on behalf of the Credit Union National
Association) ('The maintenance of . . . ownership interest means that credit
unions care deeply about what ultimately happens to the loans they
originate-they care if the loans are paid back. The sub-prime crisis, in contrast,
has been closely linked to lenders who.., cared little about repayments because
the quality of the loans they sold became someone else's problem."); Kevin
Coyne, Small Banks Stay Snug, Like the Fabled Ant, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008,
at NJ2 (attributing the success of small banks in avoiding the financial crisis to
"[s]taying small and staying home'); Longman & Frank, Too Small, supra note
208, at 16 ("When savers, borrowers, and lenders all live in the same community
... [lenders] know their business depends on their good reputation. Similarly,
borrowers, who prize the good opinion of their neighbors, don't easily walk away
from their loans.'); David Pevear, Bank On It: Your Cash Is Safe, SUN (Lowell,
Mass.), Oct. 17, 2008, at Al ("[Local banks] bring in local deposits and lend out
locally, one loan at a time, to qualified borrowers with whom they develop face-
to-face relationships.. .'); Kevin Post, Local Banks Tell Customers: Your Money
Is Safe, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Sept. 18, 2008, at C4 ('The reality is, when you
keep your money close to home in a community bank, you're safe and sound.');
Christina Rexrode, Small Banks Buck Subprime Downturn, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Feb. 2, 2008, at 1D (noting that local community banks "'know their
lenders in many ways, not just information on a form that was faxed to them
from somebody somewhere else in the country."' and that community bankers
take great care in lending because they "work .... go to church, [and] go to
school with the people in our community. We would not want to make a loan to
someone that they could not repay at a later date."); David Segal, We're Dull,
Small Banks Say, and Have Profit to Show for It, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2009, at
Al ("Forget 'too big to fail.' These banks consider themselves too small to risk
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deposits from the communities they served and lending
such deposits out to borrowers in those same
communities.21 °  They were able to assess the
creditworthiness of their customers because they had repeat
dealings with them: perhaps making a car loan one day,
opening a small business line of credit the next, and opening
up a college savings fund the day after that.2 ' Such bankers
stuck to conservative underwriting principles,1 2 benefited
from the information they could gather about their
customers' creditworthiness because of repeated
transactions with them,23 and made lending decisions based
embarrassment. They are run by people who grew up in the towns where they
work, and their main fear is getting into a financial jam that will shame them in
the eyes of their neighbors.').
210. See Teresa Dixon Murray, The Little Banks That Could, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), July 6, 2008, at D1 (detailing the conservative lending strategies of
three small, local banks that kept them from being enmeshed in the subprime
meltdown); Segal, supra note 209 ("Banking should not be exciting . . . . If
banking gets exciting, there is something wrong with it."' (quoting Clay W.
Ewing, President of Retail Financial Services at German American Bancorp.)).
211. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 210 (knowledge of customers allows lenders
to assess whether a borrower will be able to repay a loan); Adam Serwer, Banks
as Heroes, AM. PROSPECT, July/Aug. 2009, at A18 (stating that because
community banks know their customers via long-term relationships they are
able to accurately evaluate credit-worthiness); Zezima, supra note 208 ('"There's
serious value in looking someone in the eye and understanding what their drive
is, where they're coming from and how serious they are about the project.'
(quoting Bryan Young, Vice President of First National Bank of Orwell)).
212. See, e.g., Joseph Berger, Money Lending, the Old-Fashioned Way, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at WE1 (detailing the "old-fashioned, .... conservative,"'
"common-sense" practices of a '"plain-vanilla bank"' strongly linked to its local
community); Eric Dash, Caution Pays for a Lender in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2008, at C1 (explaining the success of a small bank that stuck to the
basics, "preferring to operate as a mom-and-pop boutique instead of a financial
department store[,]" and was careful in evaluating borrowers before making
loans); Murray, supra note 210 ("[Blanks that haven't gotten pummeled by
mortgages have something in common: They were conservative with their
lending.., earlier this decade when most banks were falling all over themselves
to make every loan possible.'); Posting of Ryan Goldberg to Top Stocks,
http://blogs.moneycentral.msn.com/topstocksarchive/2009/07/21/the-best-little-
bank-in-america.aspx (July 21, 2009) (asserting that adhering to conservative
lending principles kept Sunwest Bank in Orange County, California out of the
subprime lending mess, resulting in current strong growth and potential).
213. See Murray, supra note 210 (citing a bank where every loan application is
reviewed by the head officers of the institution before being granted or denied);
Jim Rendon, Rusty Cloutier Has Money to Spare, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at
1422 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
on the viability of these customers as credit risks over the
long-term because they wanted a long-term relationship
that would generate more business over time with these
customers." 4 For the most part, bankers that stuck to this
approach have been able to avoid the worst of the fallout
from the financial crisis because they reacted to, and took
into account, the forces similar to those that inform our
understanding of how repeat players in prisoner dilemma
games tend to behave: when one cares about one's
reputation, and one wants to pursue a cooperative
relationship over the long-term, one is more likely to behave
in a trustworthy fashion. Trustworthy conduct leads to
trust, and that trust has an economic payoff, especially for
the merchant looking to maintain and foster strong and
repeat trading relationships with customers.1 5
MM28 (suggesting that knowing one's customers is the key to successful
lending); see also Phillip Longman & Ellen Seidman, To Save America's
Finances, Bring Back Community Banking, NEW AM. FOUND., Nov. 20, 2008),
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/special/save americasfinances bring-
back_communitybanking_8399 [hereinafter Longman & Seidman, To Save
America's Finances] ("[S]mall-scale banking means that savers, borrowers, and
lenders all have a heightened ability to judge each other's character and to hold
each other accountable .... [S]mall-scale banks are rich with what Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke calls 'informational capital,' which they
develop through 'gathering relevant information, as well as by maintaining
ongoing relationships with customers.' Or as the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
put it . . .in a 2004 report: . . . 'the most relevant indicators regarding the
creditworthiness of individual small businesses still take the form of firsthand
information gained through close lender-borrower relationships.").
214. See, e.g., Rexrode, supra note 209 ("Community banks . .. [are] more
concerned than many mortgage orginators about keeping customers for the long
term."); Segal, supra note 209. Segal quotes a saying heard among community
bankers in Indiana that "We want to be around for decades, so we're not focused
on the next quarter." Segal, supra note 209.
215. See Bordonaro, supra note 208 ('Public confidence'is a crucial issue,' said
Bill McGurk, CEO and president of Rockville Bank. 'Banks need to reach a
sense of trust with their depositors."); see also Longman & Frank, Too Small,
supra note 208 (suggesting that banks closely tied to their community have a
vested interest in promoting the well-being of that community, and this is
reflected in their financial practices); Rendon, supra note 213 (describing how
conservative, relationship-based banking practices have resulted in profits and
the solvency to keep lending during the current financial situation); Serwer,
supra note 197 (explaining that the community-focused practices of ShoreBank
has positioned it to offer help to people suffering as a result of the subprime
crisis); Longman & Seidman, To Save America's Finances, supra note 213
(suggesting that "relationship banking' and the other practices of small,
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Another subject that has received a great deal of
attention over the last year has been what role, if any, did
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)216 play in the
financial crisis. Some commentators have argued that the
CRA forced banks to make unwise loans to risky borrowers;
and when those borrowers defaulted on those loans, those
defaults triggered the financial crisis.217 Such a line of
argument might offer succor to those who would prefer to
lay the blame for the financial crisis on a fairly modest law,
one that was passed thirty years before the financial crisis
began to unfold, than to acknowledge the wrongdoing that
was truly at the heart of the present crisis. Moreover, such
an argument cannot be squared with the stark reality that
the CRA was largely irrelevant to the financial crisis,
mostly because it covered only a tiny fraction of the
subprime loans consummated during the subprime
mortgage market's heyday. In fact, an analysis of the effect
of the CRA on bank lending activity actually shows that
lending that was covered by the CRA was far more stable
than that which was not covered by the CRA, even when
such different types of lending were carried out by the very
same bank. Given that this modest law had little bite,
particularly over the last decade and regulators were loathe
to enforce it vigorously, one can look at the informal effect
the law had on bank conduct in a deregulatory environment
to test some of the theories of informal controls. To do that,
some background on the law is in order.
The CRA was passed in 1977 to authorize federal bank
regulators218  to use their authority to "to encourage
community banks be used as a model for moving beyond the current financial
crisis and for preventing the next one).
216. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006).
217. See, e.g., Howard Husock, Housing Goals We Can't Afford, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2008, at A49 ("Banks were [sic] now being judged not on how their
loans performed but on how many loans they made. This undermined the
regulatory emphasis on safety and soundness.'); Charles Krauthammer,
Catharsis, Then Common Sense, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2008, at A23 ("[The
CRA] led to tremendous pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac-which in
turn pressured banks and other lenders-to extend mortgages to people who
were borrowing over their heads.").
218. The regulators, and the types of financial institutions they each regulate,
are as follows: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency applies the law with
respect to national banks; "the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System with respect to State chartered banks which are members of the Federal
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[financial] institutions to help meet the credit needs of the
local communities in which they are chartered consistent
with the safe and sound operation of such institutions."2 '9
Federal bank regulators grade covered banks on their
overall performance in meeting their CRA obligations.22 °
This record of performance is taken into account when
banks seek approval of certain transactions.22 ' The CRA is
also "enforced" by private actors, when citizens and
community groups file CRA "challenges" or "protests" at the
time a financial institution applies to its regulators for
approval of any transaction covered by the CRA.222 At the
end of the day, the regulators have the final say over
whether a financial institution's application should be
approved either in light of, or despite, their record of
meeting community credit needs.
What is almost as important as what the CRA covers is
what it does not cover. The CRA does not apply to the
following entities and transactions: mortgage lending
carried by non-depository institutions, a bank's activities
outside of its CRA assessment area (i.e., where it receives
its deposits or where a large percentage of its lending takes
place); bank activities carried out by the subsidiaries of
depository institutions, if those covered institutions elect
not to have the conduct of their subsidiaries assessed for
Reserve System and bank holding companies;" the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation "with respect to State chartered banks and savings banks which are
not members of the Federal Reserve System and the deposits of which are
insured by the Corporation;" and the Office of Thrift Supervision with respect to
savings association, "the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation" and savings and loan holding companies. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2902(1).
219. Id. § 2901(b) (emphasis added).
220. As a result of these examinations, banks are given one of four "ratings"
based on the evaluations conducted: "outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs to
improve," or "substantial noncompliance." Id. § 2906(b)(2).
221. Id. § 2903(a). These transactions include applications for any of the
following: "a charter for a national bank or Federal savings and loan
association;" "deposit insurance in connection with a newly chartered.., bank;"
the opening of a branch or other facility that will accept deposits; the relocation
of a home or branch office; or the merger, consolidation, or acquisition of another
regulated financial institution in certain circumstances. Id. § 2902(3).
222. See Richard D. Marsico, The New Community Reinvestment Act
Regulations: An Attempt at Implementing Performance-Based Standards, 49
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 47, 48 (1995).
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compliance with the CRA; and lending to individuals who
are not of low- or moderate-income."' As the following
discussion shows, it is these exemptions that rendered the
overwhelming majority of subprime lending carried out
during the height of the subprime mortgage market beyond
the scope of the CRA.
Over its relatively brief history, the CRA has worked
effectively to bring credit to communities that banks and
other financial institutions traditionally failed to serve.224
And even during the height of the subprime mortgage
market, CRA-related lending outperformed other types of
lending in many respects. A recent study conducted by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of CRA-
related lending in 2005-2006 showed that borrowers
connected to CRA-related loans were half as likely to fall
behind on their mortgage payments as subprime
borrowers.225 This study also showed that with respect to
223. For an in-depth look at the exemptions that made the CRA largely
irrelevant to the overwhelming majority of subprime lending, see Raymond H.
Brescia, Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and the
Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. REV. 617, 642-45 (2009).
224. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community
Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 566 (2005) ("[Tlhe CRA
and their affiliates made nearly $620 billion in home mortgage, small business,
and community development loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers and
communities."); Douglas D. Evanoff & Lewis M. Segal, CRA and Fair Lending
Regulations: Resulting Trends in Mortgage Lending, ECON. PERSP., Nov./Dec.
1996, at 19; Lewis M. Segal & Daniel G. Sullivan, Trends in Homeownership:
Race, Demographics, and Income, ECON. PERSP., 2d Quarter 2008, at 53, 68
(finding CRA lending reduced minority homeownership rate gap during two
year period between 1995-1997); ERIC S. BELSKY ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR Hous.
STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., THE EFFECT OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT ON
BANK AND THRIFT HOME PURCHASE MORTGAGE LENDING (2001),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/belschillyezer-cr
a01-1.pdf; JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., THE 25TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN AN
EVOLVING FINANCIAL SERVICES SYSTEM 48, 53-54 (2002),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/cra02-l.pdf
(indicating that prime mortgage lending carried out in minority communities
was the strongest when carried out by banks acting within their CRA
assessment areas); ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A BASELINE
REPORT, ES-5 chart ES-5, 70 chart 14, 74 chart 16 (2000),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/crareport.pdf.
225. Memorandum from Glenn Canner & Neil Bhutta, Div. of Research and
Statistics, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. to Sandra Braunstein, Dir.,
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foreclosures in the second quarter of 2008, non-CRA,
subprime borrowers were twenty times more likely to end up
in foreclosure than borrowers in a CRA-related program."'
If lending under the CRA has proven so effective in
encouraging banks to make sound loans, how is it that the
subprime mortgage market was able to spin out of control?
If CRA-covered loans were not at as great a risk of default
as subprime loans generally, why have we found ourselves
in the current crisis, with default rates in California and
Florida hovering around ten percent? Simply put, because of
the many loopholes discussed above-that mortgage
lenders, bank subsidiaries, and lending outside of bank CRA
assessment areas are all outside the scope of the CRA-the
CRA was basically irrelevant to the overwhelming majority
of subprime lending during the peak of that market and a
recent Federal Reserve study bears this out. Indeed,
reviewing loans made in 2005-2006, the Fed determined
that the CRA covered only 6% of all higher-priced loans (the
Federal Reserve's proxy for subprime loans).227
Looking at the CRA as a formal, third-party control on
bank conduct, the formal mechanisms within the law
appear rather weak. Since bank regulators are supposed to
take into account the extent to which covered financial
institutions are meeting the credit needs of the communities
they serve, one would expect that the records of those
institutions during a period of aggressive and risky
banking, particularly in low- and moderate-income
communities, would have caused banks to receive low
grades under the CRA. The contrary is true, however. The
examination process has yielded few low grades, as over
98% of banks now receive either an "outstanding" or
"satisfactory" score, and this figure has increased
Consumer & Cmty. Affairs Div., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 10
tbl.7 (Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/20081
203_analysis.pdf; see also Lei Ding et al., Ctr. for Comty. Capital, Univ. N.C.,
Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages: Disaggregating Effects Using Propensity
Score Models 1 (Dec. 2008) (working paper, on file with the University of North
Carolina Center for Community Development), available at
http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/RiskyMortgFinalDecll.pdf (showing better
performance of CRA-related loans as compared to non-CRA-related subprime
loans even with borrowers of similar income and creditworthiness).
226. Canner & Bhutta, supra note 225, at 10.
227. Id. at 3.
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significantly over the last twenty years. 21 In 1990, just
under 10% of banks received either a score of "needs to
improve" or "substantial noncompliance. '29 Between 1990
and 1994, the number dropped to just over 5%.230 During the
height of the subprime mortgage market, the figures were
0.7% for 2003, 0.8% for 2004, and 1.0% for 2005.23
Since the examination process seems to have become a
rote affair, perhaps it is at the application approval process
that the CRA bares its teeth. Unfortunately, that is not the
case either. From 1985 through 1999 (a period before the
rapid expansion of the subprime market), less than 0.8%
(692 out of 92,177) of bank applications subject to the CRA
received any adverse comments, either on CRA or other
grounds.232 Only 8 applications of these 692 in which
adverse comments were received were denied for any
reason.233 At the end of the day, 8 out of 92,177 bank
applications were denied on any grounds (or less than .01%
of all bank applications) during this fifteen-year period.234
More recent evidence from applications before the Federal
Reserve reveals that that body received 13,500 bank
applications from 1988 through May 2007, and only 8 of
them, less than .06%, were denied on grounds described as
"unsatisfactory consumer protection and community needs
issues.'235
If these formal mechanisms are not the source of the
CRA's success, then informal forces must be at work.
Richard Marsico has identified four factors that motivate
228. The Community Reinvestment Act: Thirty Years of Accomplishments, but
Challenges Remain: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th
Cong. 194 (2008) (statement of John Taylor, President & Chief Executive
Officer, National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Barr, supra note 224, at 586 (citing TREASURY DEP'T, APPLICATIONS
SUBJECT TO CRA THAT WERE PROTESTED ON CRA GROUNDS (2000)).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Foreclosures at the Front Step of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 63-64 (2007) (statement of Sandra
Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs).
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banks to take their CRA records and the community group
challenges to their applications seriously: that banks are
concerned that their applications will be denied; that the
delay associated with a challenge will undermine the
underlying transaction; that the transaction costs
associated with defending the challenge will be high, and
that the bad publicity that might arise in the course of a
challenge-including, for example, allegations that a bank
discriminates against a particular community-will drive
away customers and even send stock prices down.236
These forces are all very real and often lead banks to
enter into CRA agreements settling CRA challenges and, at
least according to one analysis, such agreements have led to
as much as $6 trillion in lending in low- and moderate-
income communities since the inception of the CRA.237 Given
the remarkably small number of bank applications that are
denied on CRA grounds and the remarkably high number of
banks that receive passing grades under the CRA, these
third party controls-denial of bank applications, the CRA
ratings process-are clearly extremely weak. It is unlikely
that banks are influenced greatly by the threat of
application denials or low CRA ratings. Instead, what seems
to be the most powerful forces that likely do the most to
"encourage" banks to honor their CRA commitments are
internalized norms through which bank managers believe
they should honor these commitments (because of first order
constraints), and the very real threat that their reputation
will be harmed by negative CRA publicity should
community members file a challenge to a bank's application
(an example of informal third party constraints).238 It is
obvious then, that the CRA, given the impressive
performance record of CRA-related lending during the
expansion of the subprime market when compared to
subprime lending in that market during that time, is an
effective tool for promoting trustworthy behavior, even
though it utilizes "soft" controls, like internalized norms
236. RICHARD D. MARSICO, DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL: THE HISTORY, LAW, AND
REFORM OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 133 (2005) (citations omitted).
237. NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., CRA TOOLKIT: PROTECTING AND
PRESERVING THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 2 (2008),
https://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/2249/images/cra%20toolkit-v5.pdf.
238. MARISCO, supra note 236, at 133.
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and informal, external constraints. 239  The relationship
between CRA performance and bank reputation in the
community is the likely strongest control the CRA imposes
on banks to rein in predatory conduct. The value of this type
of reputational control is taken up again in the concluding
section below.
Congress is presently considering whether to close the
loopholes described above that place much mortgage lending
beyond the reach of the CRA and expand its coverage to
other financial sectors, including the securities and
insurance industries.2" The effectiveness of the CRA is
obvious, and its expansion makes a great deal of sense: both
to encourage compliance with formal norms, but also to
elicit responses to informal controls that can channel pro-
social behavior effectively.
C. Consumer Education, Improved Communication
Between Borrower and Lender and Transparency
Some argue that, moving forward, better consumer
education can improve the transparency of mortgage
products and limit the ability of brokers and lenders to
exploit asymmetries of information in the mortgage market
239. See, e.g., Elizabeth Laderman & Carolina Reid, Lending in Low- and
Moderate-Income Neighborhoods in California: The Performance of CRA
Lending During the Subprime Meltdown (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working
Paper No. 200805, 2008), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/commu
nity/wpapers/2008/wpO8-05.pdf. In this study, the authors used data on over
200,000 mortgages made in metropolitan California markets from 2004-2006,
which corresponds to the subprime explosion in California, to show the CRA was
not a cause of the crisis based on how the examined CRA regulated loans
performed at least as well as, if not usually significantly better than, non-CRA
loans. CRA loans made within the bank's area of operation were roughly half as
likely to be in foreclosure as those made by an independent mortgage company
(IMC) which did not have to follow CRA guidelines and that loans made by
wholesalers, typically not covered by the CRA, were at least twice as likely to be
in foreclosure. Id. at 7-8, 17-20, tbl.20; see also TRAIGER & HINCKLEY LLP, THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: A WELCOME ANOMALY IN THE FORECLOSURE
CRISIS (2008), http://www.traigerlaw.com/publications/traiger hinckley-lpcra
_foreclosure study-l-7-08.pdf ("CRA banks were substantially less likely than
other lenders to make the kinds of risky home purchase loans that helped fuel
the foreclosure crisis.").
240. See Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2009, H.R. 1479,
111th Cong. (2009)
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between such actors and prospective mortgage customers.
One of the main proponents of this approach is Robert
Shiller, who believes that improved consumer education
would put consumers on an equal footing with the financial
industry representatives with which they come in contact,
improving the ability of consumers to shop effectively in the
market for the financial products that best meet their needs
and interests.241
Would effective consumer education have helped to
prevent the present financial crisis? Would it have reduced
the number of borrowers who would have pursued complex,
adjustable rate mortgages that were like ticking time
bombs? Would a better sense of the functioning of real
estate markets, and their tendency to rise and fall cyclically,
have prevented overconfidence in that market? Did this
overconfidence tend to encourage borrowers to pursue such
products as adjustable rate mortgages out of the belief that
they could refinance that mortgage (because of ever
increasing home values) before the interest rate reset?
Evidence from at least one state tends to show that
consumer education of a sort may have made a difference in
preventing the predation that was rampant in many
communities.
Vermont has avoided most of the worst impacts of the
financial crisis.242 It routinely comes in low on any of the
indicators of housing market distress: presence of subprime
mortgages, delinquencies, and foreclosures.243 With a high
241. See SHILLER, supra note 76, at 123 ("The first step in correcting this
failure of public education is to promote comprehensive financial advice for
everyone through institutions that will make sure that all individuals, not just
the most wealthy, receive such advice.'); see also Richard H. Thaler & Cass R.
Sunstein, Op-Ed, Economic Policy for Humans, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2008, at
A13 (arguing that the complexity involved in mortgage process led to
uninformed decisions by consumers and that more transparency to allow
informed decisions is needed in the future to avoid a similar situation
developing).
242. See PAULETrE J. THABAULT, VT. BANKING COMM'R, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
BANK COMMISSIONER 1 (2009), http://www.bishca.state.vt.us/BankingDiv/ann
ual-reportMI-1.pdf (noting that while Vermont has not been '"immune to the
rise in foreclosures" consistent with national trends, fewer than 1700 new
foreclosure filings were reported in calendar year 2008 in that state).
243. As of August 26, 2009, RealtyTrac had noted that there were a total of 61
new foreclosure filings in Vermont for all of calendar year 2009. RealtyTrac,
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home ownership rate at the beginning of the Presidency of
George W. Bush, one could certainly argue that there was
little room for aggressive lending and borrowing. One could
also argue that a culture of Yankee frugality might have
prevailed in Vermont, which could have led to less
speculation and fewer borrowers pursuing larger homes or
seeking to draw on the equity in their present homes to
purchase consumer goods.2 Or one could look to the legal
infrastructure to determine the extent to which the laws on
Vermont's books at the time might have prevented the crisis
from hitting hard in that state.
An analysis of the legal infrastructure in Vermont
shows that an important law in place during the growth of
the subprime mortgage market may have helped that state
avoid some of the worst fallout from the mortgage crisis. In
that state, whenever a mortgage broker or lender attempts
to extend a loan that is more than 3 points above the
"declared" interest rate for the state (a yearly average of the
interest rate banks charge each other to borrow money), or
if the lender plans to charge the borrower 4 points or more
to close the loan, the lender must inform the borrower that
he or she might be able to obtain a loan with a lower
interest rate, fewer points, or both, and inform the borrower
that he or she can contact the state banking department to
obtain a list of other loan companies.245 This law tends to do
Vermont Trends, http://www.realtytrac.com/STATESfVermont.html (last visited
Aug. 26, 2009).
244. See Brian K. Sullivan, Vermont Foreclosures Held Off By Yankee Ways,
Land Use Laws, BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 29,2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps
/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afvnBtrNOHSk# (noting culture of frugality may
have contributed to low level of foreclosures in Vermont); see also, Katie Zezima,
Vermont Bank Thrives While Others Cut Back, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at B4.
245. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 104 (1997). The state has issued regulations
pursuant to the disclosure law, which can be found at Regulation B-98-2, "High
Rate, High Point Notices for Residential Real Estate Loans." Section 3 of the
regulations provides as follows:
Section 3. Content of Written Disclosure
The Disclosure shall:
A. Contain the following notice in uppercase letters and in a size equal
to at least 14 point bold type and otherwise distinguishable from all
other text of the Disclosure:
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three things: it alerts borrowers to the fact that their broker
might not be offering the best deal; it encourages borrowers
to shop around for better loan terms; and it operates as an
interest rate "ceiling", discouraging lenders from offering
higher interest loans for fear that the borrower will be
driven to other lenders because of the mandatory disclosure
requirements.2"
Trust and social capital are also high in Vermont. 47
Could the strength of networks of trust and trustworthy
behavior have triggered lower rates of subprime mortgages
because borrowers had long-term relationships with
lenders, and such lenders were more interested in
maintaining relationships with their borrowers than
making a fast buck? According to Governor James Douglas,
this may have also been another reason why Vermont has
experienced low delinquency and foreclosure rates: "People
know each other, know their banker. Lenders are able to
make a good judgment."248
YOU MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR A LOAN WITH EITHER A
LOWER INTEREST RATE, FEWER POINTS, OR BOTH,
FROM ANOTHER LENDER.
B. Inform the borrower(s) that they are applying for a loan with an
interest rate that exceeds the Declared Rate by more than 3 percent
and/or for which the lender shall charge more than 4 points.
C. Include a statement informing the borrower(s) that they can obtain a
list of other lenders by calling or writing to the Department of Banking,
Insurance, Securities and Health Care Administration (the
"Department's"), including the Department's telephone number and
mailing address.
D. Be signed and dated by the lender and all borrowers to be obligated
under the note.
B-98-2 VT. CODE R § 3 (1999).
246. See Sullivan, supra note 244 (quoting Tom Candon, Deputy
Commissioner of the Vermont Banking, Insurance, Securities & Health Care
Department).
247. PUTNAM, supra note 37, at 293 fig.80.
248. Sullivan, supra note 244 (quoting James Douglas, Governor of Vermont).
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What can we learn from the Vermont experience, with a
legal infrastructure that encouraged consumer education
and discouraged predatory conduct? In trying to discern the
source of Vermont's success at largely avoiding the worst of
the subprime crisis, can we tease out the role social capital
and trust and Yankee ways played in the Vermont market
to determine whether social forces and norms were a
greater determinant of fiscally sound conduct than law?
Probably not. It is likely that the disclosure law both
discouraged predatory conduct because lenders did not want
to offer loans that would trigger the disclosure requirement
for fear of losing business and instilled confidence in the
borrower that the loan terms offered were fair and
consistent with the market (because they did not trigger the
disclosure law).
It is likely impossible to find definitive evidence of the
reasons Vermont has largely escaped the worst of the
foreclosure crisis. For the disclosure law to have given
borrowers confidence in the lender when the triggering
interest rates or points were not present, those borrowers
would have had to have known of the law's existence.
Without information on borrower knowledge of the law, it is
difficult to say what effect the law had on those borrowers.
Moreover, some borrowers, when a lender offered them a
loan with features that triggered the disclosure law, might
have felt comforted by the fact that the lender was willing to
inform the prospective borrower that he or she could seek a
list of other lenders. This alone might have, instead,
triggered a borrower's belief that the lender must not have
anything to hide. The borrower might have decided to stay
with the lender as a result, despite the disclosure. Without
in-depth empirical research on this point, it is impossible to
say definitively what effect the disclosure law had on
foreclosure and delinquency rates.
Nevertheless, the perceptions of critical players in the
Vermont market suggest that the law likely discouraged
predatory conduct and improved consumer education when
triggered.249  This consumer education, coupled with
conservative underwriting and lending practices, likely
spared Vermont the harshest effects of the crash of the
subprime mortgage market. Vermont thus opens a window
into a setting in which law seems to have mattered and
249. See id.
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consumer education seemed to serve important ends
because it minimized information asymmetries and
discouraged predatory conduct.
D. Reducing Social Distance: Strong Enforcement of Anti-
discrimination Laws and Limits on Executive Pay
During the height of the subprime mortgage market,
borrowers of color were more likely to be saddled with
subprime loans. As one Federal Reserve study of mortgage
lending carried out in 2006 revealed, more than 50% of
loans to African Americans were high cost loans, while just
under 18% of loans to Whites were high cost.25 Even
controlling for income and creditworthiness, African
Americans were nearly twice as likely to have high cost
loans as Whites of similar income.25 The numbers are
similar for Latinos as well; controlling for these same
factors, Latinos were likely to enter into a subprime home
purchase loan 24% of the time, as compared to the original
figure of 17.7% for Whites.252 A study conducted by the New
York Times of subprime lending patterns in the New York
City metropolitan region showed that middle income
African Americans were five times more likely to enter into
subprime loans than Whites of similar or even lower
income.253
Private litigants have pursued several lawsuits alleging
discriminatory pricing of subprime loans: i.e., that
borrowers of color were given loans on less favorable terms
than white borrowers, and several of these cases have
already passed the motion to dismiss phase.254 Municipal
250. Robert B. Avery et al., The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES. BULL. A73,
A95 (Fed. Res. Bank) (2007), http:l/www.federalreserve.gov/pubsfbulletin2007/
pdffhmda06final.pdf.
251. Id. at A95-96.
252. Id. at A96.
253. Michael Powell & Janet Roberts, Middle Class Suffers-Neighborhoods
are Devastated, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at Al ("In New York City, for
example, black households making more than $68,000 a year are almost five
times as likely to hold high-interest subprime mortgages as are whites of
similar-or even lower-incomes.").
254. See, e.g., Taylor v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1062
(S.D. Cal. 2008); Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.
Mass. 2008).
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government litigants have pursued actions against lenders
for the promotion of subprime mortgage securitization, for
their failure to maintain foreclosed properties, and for
allegedly marketing and selling subprime products to
borrowers along racial lines. In the first round of decisions
in these types of cases, the municipalities have drawn a tie:
Cleveland's action, which attempted to frame subprime
securitization as a common law nuisance, was recently
thrown out of court, while Baltimore's racial steering case
survived an initial dismissal motion.255
Despite the actions of private litigants, a handful of
municipal governments and a number of state attorneys
general,5 6 the federal government has yet to enter into the
litigation fray. While the FBI is reportedly pursuing
criminal investigations into subprime lending abuses, 2
federal officials have yet to assume a prominent role in
pursuing allegations of lending discrimination and steering
during the height of the subprime mortgage frenzy.
To the extent that discrimination in lending is a product
of social distance, where lenders do not share socioeconomic,
ethnic, or racial traits with the borrowers with whom they
conduct business, vigorous enforcement of such laws as the
Fair Housing Act 5 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act2 5 1
will help to rein in the potential for discriminatory lending
practices. The federal government should take an active and
vigorous enforcement role in pursuing allegations of lending
discrimination in the subprime mortgage market. Such
oversight would send a clear message to the industry and
255. Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. L-08-62, 2009 WL
1916240, at *1 (D. Md. July 2, 2009); City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage
Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
256. One example of state attorney generals' lawsuits targeted at fraud in the
subprime mortgage market: last year, Bank of America settled 11 state lawsuits
filed against its subsidiary, Countrywide Financial. These cases raised a range
of state law claims for fraud and unfair trade practices, though none alleged
lending discrimination. For a description of this litigation, see Raymond H.
Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Torts Approach to Subprime
Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CINc. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
257. Proposals to Fight Fraud and Protect Taxpayers Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary (2009) (testimony of John S. Pistole, Deputy Director, FBI)
(describing efforts of the FBI to combat mortgage and other financial frauds).
258. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006).
259. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a)-1691(f) (2006).
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the general public that the government will intervene to
prevent social distance from creating a greater likelihood
that lenders will engage in discriminatory practices.
Another area in which government intervention could
help to reduce social distance is in the area of executive pay.
If we are to recognize the effect that social distance can
have on rent seeking, the social distance between executives
and the general public created by both exorbitant executive
pay packages and compensation schemes makes it more
likely that executives will, in turn, cheat the public. It also
reduces the trust that the general public has in those
executives, especially if they are receiving high pay yet
inflicting serious harm on the economy. Indeed, there are
few issues that have generated as much heat, if not light, in
the crisis as the battle over executive compensation.2 0 One
need not look beyond the outrage generated over the
distribution of bonuses at AIG after it was bailed out by the
federal government to recognize that this issue is one that,
at least during the deepest moments of uncertainty during
the crisis, resonated with the American people. While the
furor over executive compensation seems to have dissipated
somewhat (the news about large bonuses at Goldman Sachs
and JP Morgan Chase has not caused much of a stir), the
Obama Administration has articulated the need to align
executive compensation with long-term incentives, rather
than short-term gain, and is proposing ways to make
executive compensation schemes more transparent to
shareholders.26
The question of whether these or other compensation
reforms will have any success on Capitol Hill is likely to
attract a great deal of attention in the coming months. This
is obviously a topic that is of great concern to the financial
260. The New York Post, during the swirling storm over AIG bonuses, ran the
following on its cover, in large-type print: "Not So Fast You Greedy Bastards:
Feds Plan 100% Tax on AIG Bonuses." N.Y. POST, Mar. 18, 2009.
261. Obama Plan, supra note 3, at 44-45; see also Posting of Jessica Lee to
White House Briefing Room Blog,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Accountability-on-Executive-Compensation
(June 10, 2009, 15:16 EST) (describing Secretary Geithner's announcement of
the Administration's desire for legislation authorizing the SEC to require non-
binding shareholder votes on executive compensation) For more information on
the executive compensation legislation see U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FACT SHEET:
ENSURING INVESTORS HAVE A "SAY ON PAY,"
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/fact-sheet_say/20on%20pay.pdf.
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industry. There is a strong fear that executive compensation
restrictions-whether on firms accepting federal funds
through such programs as the Troubled Asset Relief
Program or on certain industries generally-will limit the
ability of companies subject to such restrictions to recruit
the best talent. The Obama Administration's proposals,
though relatively weak, may be the strongest types of
restrictions that can be imposed politically. In the final part,
below, I suggest ways that voluntary limits on executive
compensation could be proposed that would help lower
social distance, both real and perceived, thereby reducing
the effect that such social distance can have on rent seeking
and the generation of trust, and align long-term interests
with present compensation, taking into account repeat-play
phenomena.
These and other areas are fertile ground for a broad
effort to re-regulate financial markets. The debate over the
optimal regulatory approach across a broad range of
products and sectors within the financial industry is likely
to carry on for months, if not years. Lobbyists for the
financial industry are likely to have a significant impact on
the final versions of legislation and regulation that comes
out of this reform effort, with the most aggressive attempts
likely watered down through force of will, time, inertia and
gravity. What follows is an attempt to suggest ways that a
less contentious process might prove fruitful, and might
hew a faster path towards rebuilding trust and
trustworthiness than the sausage-making processes of
regulatory and legislative reform.
V. HEURISTICS FOR TRUSTWORTHINESS: RETURN OF THE BLUE
EAGLE OR THE RISE OF THE BLUE PHOENIX?
There is no question that, to restore trust in the
financial system, the regulatory infrastructure needs
shoring up in order to fill the legal vacuums in which such
instruments like credit default swaps are used and entities
like credit rating agencies operate. Will the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission, created by Congress, help to uncover
information about the root causes of the financial crisis to
assure the general public that any regulatory structure will
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respond to the causes of the crisis?262 Will more robust
enforcement of the securities laws and monitoring by bank
regulators of financial institution adherence to safety and
soundness requirements help to restore faith that the
guardians are faithfully executing their duties? There is a
desperate and unquestionable need for the creation of an
entity like the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, one
that will be positioned to assess the merits of the use of
exotic financial products and the extent to which other
practices might cause harm and increase risk
irresponsibly.2 Yet even with such a consumer advocate in
place, it is unlikely that most consumers and investors will
be able to process all of the information that the re-
regulation effort will generate so that they might be able to
use this information to decide whether they can place their
faith in financial services providers. But without such faith,
on both microeconomic and macroeconomic levels,
regulatory efforts designed to restore trust in the financial
system will be for naught.
Lay people-prospective home purchasers, individuals
investing their retirement savings in 401(k) plans, and
individuals trying to determine how to design their
investment portfolios-will need mechanisms for assessing
the trustworthiness of the financial products and services in
which they might wish to place their faith. Individuals
inside and outside the Obama Administration are
advocating one such effort: the standardization of mortgage
products so that mortgage lenders will be required to offer a
"plain vanilla" mortgage, one with easy to understand-and
fixed-terms. If prospective borrowers wish to pursue more
exotic mortgage terms, they will have to make a conscious
and explicit decision to opt out of the plain vanilla model.
Such a default rule will make mortgage lending simpler,
and reduce the risk that lenders will be able to benefit from
the limited information borrowers may have about the
262. Stephen Labaton, A Panel Is Named to Examine Causes of the Economic
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at B3 (describing creation of the commission
and its appointment of members).
263. See Obama Plan, supra note 3, at 55-62, for a description of the proposed
CFPA.
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mortgage market in general and mortgage products in
particular.2"
Can we use similar heuristics, or short-cuts, on a
broader scale, and in such a way that will give consumers
and investors easy-to-process information about the
credibility of actors within the financial system and the
safety of the products they offer?265 While a granular
analysis of all of the features of the proposed legislation
presently before Congress and more that will most certainly
be introduced over the coming year, is beyond the scope of
this piece, what follows is an effort to introduce a process by
which regulators could provide simple, easy-to-understand
information to consumers on the practices of the financial
services industry: i.e., the extent to which such practices are
more likely to make them trustworthy (more on this in a
moment). Modeled on voluntary efforts utilized in the New
Deal-as opposed to top-down regulatory efforts-the
approach presented here would provide financial
institutions the regulatory space they need to operate
effectively and efficiently, while instilling confidence in
their good faith and good will.
During the New Deal, the National Recovery
Administration, working with industrial trade associations,
developed codes of conduct related to labor practices in a
wide range of commercial and manufacturing sectors. Firms
that followed these codes were permitted to display a "Blue
Eagle" decal in their advertising materials and product
labels. Consumers were encouraged to purchase goods
manufactured by companies that complied with these
voluntary codes.2" While the codes were criticized severely
264. See Barr et al., supra note 77 (suggesting that lenders offer simple
mortgage product as default option for most borrowers); see also Obama Plan,
supra note 3, at 66-67 (describing proposed regulatory role of encouraging
financial institutions to offer consumers simple, easy-to-understand financial
products).
265. See Cross, supra note 16, at 1510-11, for a description of the application
of heuristics.
266. Numerous commentators have discusses the background of the Blue
Eagle Program. See, e.g., DAVID EDWIN HARRELL, JR. ET AL., UNTO A GOOD LAND:
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 906-07 (2005) (describing the purpose,
creation and decline of the 1933 "Blue Eagle" National Recovery Administration
program calling on employers to voluntarily limit worker hours and raise
minimum wages to help put people to work during the Depression); Erik
McKinley Eriksson, Blue Eagle Emblem in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY
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at the time from many sectors, 267 ultimately, the program
was struck down as unconstitutional because Congress, in
creating the program, had delegated too much authority to
the Executive, and because the codes were found to have an
insufficient nexus to interstate commerce.268
Yet such a voluntary approach, albeit without the
constitutional deficiencies, might be just what the financial
system could use at this time. Could regulators utilize these
same techniques to give consumers and investors the
confidence that financial institutions were following
practices that were smart, safe, and designed to instill
trust?269 Reviewing the principles discussed above, could
regulators develop a series of codes of conduct for different
actors in the financial system that could give the public
faith that such individuals and institutions were acting in
ways that were more likely to generate trustworthy
conduct? Returning to those principles-of regulatory
oversight, repeat play, enhanced communication, and
reduced social distance: could regulators craft different sets
of practices designed with these principles in mind, and
then recognize financial institutions when they follow those
practices? Such a "seal of approval", whether it was
signified by a Blue Eagle or other symbol (a Blue Phoenix,
let's say), would give consumers confidence that a particular
financial institution was adopting practices that tended to
make them more trustworthy.
For example, in the mortgage lending industry, the
Federal Reserve or another bank regulator could develop a
set of "trust practices" within the industry: practices
490 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 3d ed. 2003) ("All who accepted President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's reemployment agreement or the special Code of Fair Competition
could display a poster that reproduced the blue eagle with the motto 'Member
N.R.A. We Do Our Part."' (emphasis in original)); James G. Pope, National
Industrial Recovery Act (1933) in 3 MAJOR ACTS OF CONGRESS 31 (Brian K.
Landsberg ed., 2004) (describing the "Codes of Fair Competition" and the
implementation strategy of the N.R.A. "Blue Eagle" program).
267. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 253-54 (1998) (recounting criticism).
268. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
269. Due to the interconnected nature of financial products, institutions, and
markets, no one would argue that the financial sector does not affect interstate
commerce. Similarly, if the codes were truly voluntary, their promotion would
not constitute an improper delegation of legislative functions to the Executive.
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modeled on the principles of regulatory oversight, repeat
play, enhanced communication, and reduced social distance.
In that sector, the types of behavior that would likely lend
to more untrustworthy behavior would include the
following: "originate to securitize" practices, through which
lenders do not hold the mortgages they produce, instead
selling them on the secondary market, sometimes days or
even hours after a loan closes; offering exotic mortgage
products, without options for simpler, more straightforward
loans; offering no consumer financing other than mortgage
financing, reducing the likelihood that such lenders would
seek to work with borrowers in other product lines, like
savings or checking accounts, or auto loans; compensation
practices for executives and mortgage officers that reward
quantity of loans over their quality and offer large
compensation packages based on short-term profits rather
than long-term sustainability; working with brokers that
are not acting as the fiduciaries of the borrowers; and the
failure to maintain adequate cash reserves to permit the
repurchase of underperforming loans that have been sold on
the secondary market.
In response, voluntary codes of trust-instilling practices
in this sector would include a package of practices that are
more likely than not to promote trustworthy behavior.
Lending institutions would have to organize themselves in
such a way so that they would not escape oversight by
appropriate federal and state regulators (and the Federal
Reserve could even approve the oversight system of each
state, and confirm whether it has a robust and effective
state regulatory structure and capacity).27 Such institutions
would have to certify that they were not engaged in
practices that were largely outside the law, like offering
pay-day loans, and would have to offer the types of plain
vanilla mortgage products discussed above. Similarly, they
would have to offer a range of consumer products, or
270. Such an approach would be consistent with practices in the
environmental context under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(g)
(2006), and Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006) in which the states
are the primary regulators, subject to federal approval of their oversight
structure and practices. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7661(b)(4) (requiring adequate
personnel and funding to administer the permit program); 42 U.S.C. §
7661(a)(d)(3) (authorizing Environmental Protection Agency to administer
permit program within states in which the EPA has not approved a state
program for same).
2009] 1441
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
affiliate with financial institutions that did, to show that
they were at least interested in a range of business relations
with their prospective mortgage customers. They would
warrant that they would only work with brokers that acted
as fiduciaries towards the borrowers with which they work
and followed compensation practices that aligned the
interest of employees with the long-term stability and
viability of the lending practices of the institution.
Furthermore, institutions would voluntarily adopt executive
compensation packages that would reduce, rather than
increase, social distance between the customers of the
institution and its leaders. Finally, to the extent that they
were packaging and attempting to securitize the mortgages
they generate, or engaging in similar, yet to be devised
practices, they would have to maintain a portion of these
loans on their own books, as well as reserves to cover the
cost of any loans that would have to be repurchased for
nonperformance .27'
The regulatory agency responsible for overseeing
mortgage lending would authorize mortgage lenders that
follow these practices to display the Blue Phoenix in their
marketing materials, websites, and anywhere else they
choose. Just as consumers might look for "the union label"
or the Good Housekeeping "seal of approval," the sign of the
Blue Phoenix would send a message to prospective
customers that the lender was engaging in a range of
practices that tend to make it more trustworthy rather than
less.272 It would also send that message to investors that
might be interested in purchasing on the secondary market
the loans the lender generated.
With a marketing effort that emphasized the
importance of trust-producing practices and the significance
of the Blue Phoenix, it is likely that the market would
generate significant support for firms that followed the
voluntary codes of conduct.
271. This concept, known as "skin in the game," is one of the proposals of the
Obama Plan; mortgage loan securitizers would be required to maintain on their
books 5% of the loans they package to be sold on the securitization market. See
Obama Plan, supra note 3, at 44.
272. On the use of heuristics in the political realm, see Heather K. Gerken,
Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1582 (2009) for a description of party
affiliation of candidates as a heuristic on which voters rely.
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The codes themselves would be fine tuned for each
industry, and crafted through an open dialogue between
regulators, elected officials, industry representatives, and
consumer advocates. One could envision such a package of
practices designed for each industry: e.g., credit rating
agencies that act as fiduciaries towards those who rely on
the ratings information they generate; and companies that
issue credit default swaps or their equivalent agreeing to
subject themselves to oversight by insurance regulators. At
this juncture, the point is not to establish an exhaustive list
of trust-generating practices for every industry in which the
codes would be relevant. Rather, my goal here is simple: to
introduce the concept of voluntary codes of conduct for
financial institution practices generally, where compliance
with such codes could be communicated through the use of a
heuristic symbol. That symbol would, in turn, become a
shorthand for a wealth of information valuable to
consumers and could serve to assist the general public in
making decisions about a host of financial industry
practices, in a range of settings.
Such a use of heuristics would generate more confidence
from the general public in the financial sector than
thousands of pages of legislation and regulation could ever
produce. It is unlikely that consumers and investors are
willing or able to dedicate the time to educate themselves on
the optimal package of regulatory or legislative changes
needed to shore up the oversight regime, nor would most
people have the expertise to make informed decisions about
complex financial industry practices. Without the capacity
to make such decisions, to the extent that re-regulation does
generate trust, it is more likely to be the affective kind-
more based on a feeling than on a sober assessment of the
best blend of reformed financial practices and strengthened
oversight. The use of a heuristic that communicates a range
of information to the general public would take into account
the limits of human capacity when making decisions
requiring a complex web of information and expertise.
Make no mistake, such voluntary codes of conduct
would not serve as a substitute for vigorous enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws, anti-trust laws, anti-fraud laws,
and criminal codes, or for legislation reining in credit
default swaps and other aspects of the shadow banking
system. Rather, this voluntary regime would broach some of
the more contentious issues, like executive compensation,
where the correct role of regulation is subject to heated
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debate, and correctly so. Furthermore, such a "light touch"
regime would act like a cooperative first move in a prisoner
dilemma game; regulators would signal an opening,
cooperative move by attempting to induce firms to adopt
trust-generating practices. As we know from game theory,
such first moves are likely to be mirrored by the game
partner. This first move would be coupled by regulators
cutting firms that adopt such practices a wide berth, while
ensuring vigorous enforcement of clear cut prohibitions, like
those against discrimination in lending and securities
fraud.273 By making a range of conduct voluntary and with
clear rewards for voluntary compliance that will likely
generate strong market share, it is likely that such
practices will become the norm, and not the exception.
273. See e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 35-41 (1992) (advocating that
regulators must have strong sanctions-a "benign big gun"-that makes lighter
regulatory approaches possible); Christine Parker, Reinventing Regulation
Within the Corporation: Compliance-Oriented Regulatory Innovation, 32 ADMIN.
& Soc'¥ 529, 533-35 (2000) (recognizing the role of credible enforcement in
making lighter touch regulation possible). The process of developing the
voluntary codes could itself serve valuable ends, and develop a more cooperative
relationship between the representatives of the financial industry, regulators,
and consumer advocates:
While stressing the continued need for an active public role, however,
the "new governance" acknowledges that command and control are not
the appropriate administrative approach in the world of network
relationships that increasingly exists. Given the pervasive
interdependence that characterizes such networks, no entity, including
the state, is in a position to enforce its will on the others over the long
run. In these circumstances, negotiation and persuasion replace
command and control as the preferred management approach, not only
in the setting of policy but in carrying it out. Instead of issuing orders,
public managers must learn how to create incentives for the outcomes
they desire from actors over whom they have only imperfect control.
Indeed, negotiation is even necessary over the goals that public action
is to serve since part of the reason that third parties are often cut into
the operation of public programs is that such clarity cannot be achieved
at the point of enactment.
Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1635-36 (2001) (footnote omitted).
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CONCLUSION
The forces that drive people to trust and to be
trustworthy are complex, varied, external, and internal. The
optimal alignment of these forces that will encourage both
trusting and trustworthy behavior, while discouraging their
opposites, is often elusive, which does not mean that
balance should not be sought. The Obama Administration,
regulators, legislators, financial services providers, and
consumers all have a large stake in restoring trust to the
financial system. Doing so is critical not just to speed the
recovery, but also to prevent the next crisis. It is
respectfully submitted that some of the principles discussed
here could help inform these efforts, by shedding light on
the forces that could generate both trust and
trustworthiness. Both are essential to this endeavor.

